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MINIMIZING PROBATE-ERROR RISK
Mark Glover*
Probate-error risk is the possibility that a court will incorrectly assess the authentic-
ity of a will. By prescribing the method courts use to evaluate the authenticity of
wills, the law of will-execution allocates probate-error risk between false-positive out-
comes and false-negative outcomes. When a court validates an inauthentic will, it
creates a false-positive outcome. When a court invalidates an authentic will, it
creates a false-negative outcome. Because false-positive outcomes result in the ad-
mission to probate of inauthentic wills and false-negative outcomes result in the
denial of probate of genuine wills, both can be characterized as probate errors.
This framework has been used to identify the problem with the conventional law of
will-execution, which is that it generates unnecessary probate errors by heavily allo-
cating risk in favor of false-negative outcomes. It has also clarified the objective of
will-execution reform, which is to reallocate risk more evenly between false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes so that the total number of probate errors is
minimized.
This Article applies this framework more broadly to analyze potential methods of
will-execution reform. Specifically, this Article identifies the various components of
the law of will-execution that can be altered to reallocate probate-error risk and
evaluates how different methods of reform can be manipulated to reallocate risk to
varying degrees. With a better understanding of what is possible, state policymakers
may be more willing to break away from the conventional law and implement
change.
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INTRODUCTION
The law of will-execution differentiates wills from non-wills by
prescribing the requirements for a valid will. Under conventional
law, wills must be written, signed, and witnessed.1 If a purported will
complies with these formalities, it is valid;2 but, if it does not, it is
invalid.3 These requirements are not intended to delineate an arbi-
trary boundary between what is and is not a will. Instead, will-
execution is meant to distinguish authentic wills from inauthentic
wills.
When framed in this way, the law of will-execution can be seen as
a binary classification test. A binary classification test is simply a
method to place individuals or things into one of two categories
based upon a particular characteristic.4 For example, a pregnancy
test is a binary classification test that classifies a woman as either
pregnant or not pregnant. Typically, the classification is not based
upon direct observation of the relevant characteristic.5 Because di-
rect observation is impossible or impracticable, the test makes the
classification based on indirect evidence.6 For instance, a pregnancy
test does not make a direct observation of the presence or absence
of an embryo.7 Rather, it classifies a woman as pregnant or not
1. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 148 (9th ed.
2013); see also infra Part I.A.
2. A will’s validity also depends on other considerations, such as the testator possessing
the required mental and legal capacities to execute a will. See, e.g., Mark Glover, Rethinking the
Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69 (2014).
3. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489,
489 (1975).
4. See GRAEME D. RUXTON & NICK COLEGRAVE, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR THE LIFE SCI-
ENCES 120 (3d ed. 2011).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See MARY JANE MINKIN & CAROL V. WRIGHT, THE YALE GUIDE TO WOMEN’S REPRODUC-
TIVE HEALTH 296 (2003).
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pregnant based upon indirect evidence found in the woman’s
blood or urine.8
Similarly, the law of will-execution is a binary classification test
that places a purported will into one of two categories—authentic
or inauthentic. A will is authentic if the decedent intended it to be
legally effective, and conversely, a will is inauthentic if the decedent
did not intend it to be legally effective. Direct observation of any-
one’s subjective intent is impossible.9 Furthermore, because the
decedent is dead at the time of probate, the court cannot ask the
decedent whether she intended a particular document to constitute
a legally effective will.10 The classification of a will as authentic or
inauthentic is therefore made using indirect evidence of the dece-
dent’s intent. Specifically, the law relies upon the decedent’s
compliance with the formalities of will-execution to serve as an eas-
ily recognizable proxy for the intent that a will be legally effective.11
Under conventional law, if the decedent complies with the for-
malities of will-execution, the court presumes that she intended the
document to be a legally effective will, and it therefore classifies the
will as authentic.12 Alternatively, if the decedent does not comply
with the prescribed formalities, the court presumes that she did not
intend the document to be a will, and it therefore classifies the will
as inauthentic.13 Thus, like women who use pregnancy tests to de-
termine whether or not they are pregnant, probate courts use the
law of will-execution to determine whether or not the decedent in-
tended a will to be legally effective. In this way, the law of will-
execution distinguishes authentic wills from inauthentic wills.
8. See id. (“All pregnancy tests, whether of urine or blood, look for the presence of beta
hCG, the beta subunit of human chorionic gonadotropin, a hormone produced by the divid-
ing cells of the embryo even before it is implanted with the uterus . . . .”).
9. See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 656 (1988)
(explaining that intestacy statutes “suffer[ ] from the impossible search for subjective in-
tent”); Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry Into Force: Toward
Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 283, 303 (2001) (“[A]s a philosophical truism, it
may be well-nigh impossible to identify someone else’s subjective intent; to paraphrase an
ancient maxim, not even the devil knows what is inside a man’s head.”).
10. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 147.
11. See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical
Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 391–92 (2001) (“To facilitate realization of testamentary free-
dom, the law historically has required individuals to set forth dispositive desires in a written
statement executed with formalities sufficient to identify to the individual executing the in-
strument and the world at large that the writing is intended to be a will.”).
12. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 514–15.
13. See id. at 489.
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Because binary classification tests make classifications based
upon indirect evidence of the relevant characteristic, they some-
times produce erroneous results that do not reflect reality.14 These
inaccurate classifications can be categorized as either false-positive
outcomes or false-negative outcomes.15 In the context of pregnancy,
a false-positive outcome occurs when the test indicates that a
woman is pregnant but in fact she is not.16 A false-negative outcome
occurs when a pregnancy test indicates that a woman is not preg-
nant when in reality she is.17 Similarly, the law of will-execution
produces incorrect determinations regarding a will’s authenticity. A
false-negative outcome occurs when a court invalidates an authentic
will because the decedent mistakenly failed to comply with the pre-
scribed formalities.18 A false-positive outcome occurs when a court
validates a formally compliant document when the decedent none-
theless did not intend it to be a legally effective will.19 Because false-
negative outcomes deny probate to authentic wills and false-positive
outcomes admit inauthentic wills to probate, both can be character-
ized as “probate errors.”
Although most probate courts still differentiate wills in this way,
the conventional law of will-execution has been a target of reform
for roughly forty years.20 Critics argue that the conventional law in-
validates too many authentic wills because of harmless formal
defects,21 and they seek to change the law so that more authentic
wills are validated.22 This reform movement has near unanimous
14. See RUXTON & COLEGRAVE, supra note 4, at 120 (explaining that because binary classi-
fication tests do “not observ[e] the condition directly, but instead rely[ ] on an indirect
measure, there is an obvious question about the reliability of [the] classification”); Harry
Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 98 (2014) (“Because proxies are
stand-ins for some other underlying phenomenon, they necessarily are under- and over-inclu-
sive relative to the phenomenon they are representing, and inevitably produce false positives
and negatives.”).
15. False-positive outcomes are sometimes referred to as Type I errors, and false-nega-
tive outcomes are sometimes referred to as Type II errors. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1504 (1999).
16. MINKIN & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 297 (explaining that a false-positive outcome “can
come about if the test ‘mistakes’ luteinizing hormone (LH) for hCG, to which it is chemically
similar”).
17. See id. (explaining that a false-negative outcome “can come about if the test is done
too soon in the pregnancy or too late, since hCG levels fall again after the second month of
pregnancy”).
18. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153.
19. This could occur when a decedent deceives someone during life by telling him that
she intends a will to be legally effective, but in fact she does not. See infra notes 127–130 and
accompanying text. This could also occur when wrongdoers attempt to forge a will. See infra
notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
20. See Langbein, supra note 3; see also infra Part II.
21. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 498–503.
22. See infra Part II.
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approval from the legal academy,23 and many of its reform propos-
als have been incorporated into the Uniform Probate Code
(“UPC”) and the Restatement (Third) of Property.24 Yet despite this
broad support and long history, few states have significantly de-
parted from the conventional law.25 Within this context, questions
arise as to why the reform movement has been slow to instigate
large-scale change.
This Article suggests that the reform movement’s struggles can
be explained in part by its focus on implementing specific reforms
without developing a reform framework that clearly identifies the
problems with the conventional law and specifically explains how
reform would resolve these problems. By framing the law of will-
execution as a binary classification test that allocates probate errors
among false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes, this Ar-
ticle seeks to clarify and refine the reform effort. Although the
reform movement traditionally did not describe the law of will-exe-
cution in this way, a handful of scholars have recently outlined the
debate regarding reform in these terms.26 By doing so, these schol-
ars have illuminated the overarching problem with the
conventional law, which is that it presents a greater risk of false-
negative outcomes than false-positive outcomes. They have also
clarified the reform movement’s objective, which is to reallocate
risk more evenly so as to minimize the total number of probate
errors.27
Although this framework has provided focus to both the criticism
of the conventional law and the goal of reform, scholars generally
have not applied it more broadly to analyze particular methods of
will-execution reform. To fill this analytical void, this Article identi-
fies the various components of the law of will-execution that can be
23. See infra notes 147–152 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-502–03 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1–.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
25. For example, only ten states have adopted a harmless error rule similar to the one
found in the UPC and the Restatement. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 184.
Additionally, only two states have adopted the UPC provision authorizing notarized wills. See
id. at 196.
26. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153, 171; Daniel B. Kelly, Toward
Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 877–82 (2012);
Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence for the
Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 577–78 (2007); Robert H.
Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 647–49
(2014). Some scholars have framed other areas of the law in these terms. See, e.g., Fredrick E.
Vars, Toward a General Theory of Standards of Proof, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2010) (focusing on
testamentary capacity rules).
27. See infra Part II.
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altered to reduce probate-error risk.28  Ultimately, by framing the
law of will-execution as a binary classification test that allocates pro-
bate-error risk among false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes, this Article shifts the discussion surrounding reform
away from specific proposals and toward a more systematic ap-
proach to reform. With this framework in place, the goals and
mechanics of will-execution reform become clearer, and conse-
quently policymakers might be more willing to depart from the
conventional law.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the conven-
tional law of will-execution and explains how it allocates probate-
error risk among false-positive outcomes and false-negative out-
comes. Part II shifts the focus of the Article to the reform
movement by describing and expanding the movement’s criticism
of the conventional law. Specifically, Part II explains how the con-
ventional law produces unnecessary probate errors. Finally, Part III
analyzes how the various components of the law of will-execution
affect the allocation of risk between false-positive outcomes and
false-negative outcomes. It also develops a framework for thinking
about how reform can minimize the overall risk of probate errors.
I. PROBATE-ERROR RISK UNDER CONVENTIONAL LAW
The primary principle of the law of wills is that the decedent has
broad freedom to distribute her property upon death.29 To commu-
nicate the intent to exercise this freedom of disposition, a decedent
traditionally executes a will.30 But before accepting a will for pro-
bate administration and distributing the estate according to the
will’s terms, the court must decide whether the decedent intended
the will to be legally effective.31 If the decedent intended to leave
behind a legally effective will, the court should grant probate so
28. See infra Part III.
29. See Sitkoff, supra note 26, at 643 (“The organizing principle of the American law of
succession . . . is freedom of disposition.”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Indi-
viduals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 882–85 (2012) (“The most fundamental
guiding principle of American inheritance law is testamentary freedom—that the person
who owns property during life has the power to direct its disposition at death.”).
30. See Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will:
An Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 156 (2008) (“[E]state planning . . . at one
time involved not much more than the drafting and execution of a will.”).
31. See Matter of Will of Smith, 528 A.2d 918, 921 (N.J. 1987) (“No instrument . . . is a
will unless the signer so intends.”); Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case
Against Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 106 (2006) (“Every will . . . requires testamen-
tary intent.”).
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that the decedent’s property is disposed according to the dece-
dent’s intended estate plan. By contrast, if she did not intend the
will to be legally effective, the court should deny probate so that the
estate is not distributed in an unintended manner. The court’s task
of deciphering this intent may seem straightforward. But, because
the decedent is dead at the time of probate, the court cannot sim-
ply ask her whether she intended a particular document to
constitute a legally effective will.32
To overcome these evidentiary difficulties, the law of will-execu-
tion provides the decedent the means to communicate
testamentary intent to probate courts. Under conventional law, the
decedent must comply with a variety of formalities to execute a
valid will, including the requirements that the will be written,
signed by the decedent, and witnessed.33 The primary purpose of
these formalities is to provide courts with a reliable and easily iden-
tifiable record of testamentary intent.34 In addition to these
formalities, the conventional law includes the rule of strict compli-
ance.35 This rule prohibits courts from considering extrinsic
evidence of testamentary intent that suggests the decedent in-
tended a noncompliant document to be a legally effective will.36
A. Will Formalities
Since the enactment of the English Wills Act of 183737 and its
subsequent influence throughout the United States,38 wills must be
written, signed by the testator, and attested by two witnesses to be
32. Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
L.J 1, 6 (1941); see DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 147.
33. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The purpose of statutory formalities . . . is to determine
whether the decedent adopted the document as his or her will.”).
35. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153.
36. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 489.
37. Wills Act of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. Ch. 26 (Eng. 1837). Prior to the enactment of
the Wills Act of 1837, the Statutes of Wills of 1540 required testamentary gifts of land to be in
writing, and the Statute of Frauds of 1677 subsequently required wills disposing of land to be
written, signed by the testator, and attested by three witnesses. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,
supra note 1, at 148–49.
38. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148; Victoria J. Haneman, Changing the
Estate Planning Malpractice Landscape: Applying the Constructive Trust to Cure Testamentary Mis-
take, 80 UMKC L. REV. 91, 95 n.22 (2011) (“Though the Wills Act of 1837 was passed long
after the American Revolution, it still had a profound impact upon the foundation of the law
of wills in the United States.”).
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legally effective.39 The formality of a written document renders oral
wills invalid.40 The signature formality mandates that the testator
sign her will.41 If the testator is physically unable to sign, someone
else can sign the will at the testator’s direction if the two are in each
other’s presence at the time the will is signed and the testator in-
tends the signature to be legally effective.42 Finally, the attestation
formality requires that two witnesses observe the will-execution pro-
cess and sign the will.43
Along with these general formalities, the conventional law of will-
execution includes a variety of related technical details. Some
states, for example, have a subscription requirement that directs
the testator to sign at the end of the will rather than allowing the
testator to sign anywhere on the document.44 Other technical de-
tails include presence and publication requirements. In states that
have a presence requirement, the testator and the attesting wit-
nesses must be in each other’s presence at the time the will is
signed.45 In states that require publication, the testator must indi-
cate to the attesting witnesses that the document before them is her
will.46 These technical requirements, together with the primary for-
malities of writing, signature, and attestation, comprise the
conventional formalities of will-execution.
As mentioned previously, the primary purpose of the prescribed
will-execution formalities is to provide reliable evidence of the de-
cedent’s intent that a will be legally effective,47 and indeed the
formalities serve this function well. A decedent likely would not go
through the highly formalized process of conventional will-execu-
tion without intending to leave behind a legally effective will.48 As
39. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 147–48. In the United States, notarization
of a will may be a valid alternative to a witness signature. See id. at 149.
40. Oral wills are recognized in a minority of states under extremely limited circum-
stances. See id. at 148 n.3.
41. Id. at 160–61.
42. See id. at 161.
43. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, § 2-502(a)(3)(A) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
44. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 163.
45. See id. at 159.
46. See id. at 168–69 n.25 (“The testator may indicate to the witnesses that the instru-
ment is a will by words, signs, or conduct. Publication can be inferred from the
circumstances; even the words of another saying that the instrument is the testator’s will may
be sufficient.”).
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003). Will formalities may also serve an ancillary therapeutic function.
See generally Mark Glover, The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV.
139 (2012); Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 427 (2012).
48. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (“A competent person not subject to
undue influence, duress, or fraud is unlikely to execute an instrument in strict compliance
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such, the probate court can validate a formally compliant will with
little risk that such validation will produce a false-positive outcome.
Although the risk of false-positive outcomes is extremely low
under conventional law, the risk of false-negative outcomes is rela-
tively high. The same formalities that provide robust evidence of
the decedent’s intent also present opportunity for mistake.49 Case
after case reveals that well-meaning decedents often intend to exe-
cute valid wills but fail to comply with the prescribed formalities
because of honest mistakes.50 In such situations, the highly formal-
ized will-execution process produces false-negative outcomes
because the decedent intended a will to be legally effective, but the
will did not comply with the conventional will-execution formalities.
Thus, in this way, the formalities of will-execution allocate probate-
error risk under conventional law toward false-negative outcomes
and away from false-positive outcomes.51
B. Strict Compliance
In addition to the formalities of the execution ceremony, the
rule of strict compliance is the second primary component of the
conventional law. The rule of strict compliance is the method by
which the probate court evaluates a testator’s compliance with the
formalities of will-execution.52 When the court applies the rule of
strict compliance, it invalidates a will if the testator failed to comply
with any of the prescribed formalities.53 The reason for the testa-
tor’s failure to strictly comply is irrelevant.54 Any error in will-
with all the Wills Act formalities unless the person intends the instrument to be his will.”);
Katheleen R. Guzman, Intents and Purposes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 311 n.18 (2011) (“Few
people would undergo [the will-execution] ceremony without holding testamentary
intent.”).
49. See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s
Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 433–34 (2009).
50. See Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 PA. L.
REV. 1033, 1036 (1994) (“Courts have routinely invalidated wills for minor defects in form
even in uncontested cases . . . .”).
51. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 880 (“Currently, the concern about [false-negative out-
comes] may be greater than the concern about [false-positive outcomes]. Most disputes over
execution formalities . . . seem to involve technical defects . . . with little or no risk of fraud. If
these cases are representative of all cases, perhaps there is a much greater chance of denying
probate to a document the testator did intend to be her will . . . than probating a document
the testate did not intend to be her will . . . .”).
52. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153.
53. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 489.
54. See id.
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execution invalidates a will, regardless of the court’s confidence
that the testator intended the will to be legally effective.55
The case of Stevens v. Casdorph illustrates how the rule of strict
compliance operates.56 Miller, who “was elderly and confined to a
wheelchair,”57 asked his nephew to drive him to a bank so that he
could have his will witnessed.58 When Miller arrived, he informed
Debra Pauley, a bank employee, that he desired to execute his will,
and he signed the will in her presence.59 Pauley did not sign the will
as a witness but instead took the will to a different area within the
bank.60 Once there, Pauley told two other bank employees that
Miller wanted his will properly executed and asked them to sign the
will.61 Although the bank employees did not observe Miller sign the
will, they followed Pauley’s instructions and signed as attesting
witnesses.62
After Miller died, the validity of his will was challenged because
he and the two witnesses could not see each other at the time the
will was signed.63 This was problematic because the relevant will-
execution statute included a presence requirement.64 Despite the
lower court’s finding that Miller had intended the will to be legally
effective, the appellate court invalidated the will because of this er-
ror in execution.65 The court reasoned that the “mere intent by a
testator to execute a written will is insufficient.”66 Instead, both
“[t]estamentary intent and a written instrument” that complies with
the prescribed formalities “are essential to the creation of a valid
will.”67
As Stevens v. Casdorph illustrates, when the court applies the con-
ventional rule of strict compliance, it invalidates a will for any
formal defect regardless of how much evidence suggests that the
55. See id. (“The most minute defect in formal compliance is held to void the will, no
matter how abundant the evidence that the defect was inconsequential.”).
56. See Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610 (W. Va. 1998).
57. Id. at 611 n.1.




62. See id. at 611–12.
63. See id.
64. See id. The relevant statute states: “No will shall be valid unless it be in writing and
signed by the testator” and “the signature shall be made or the will acknowledged by him in
the presence of at least two competent witnesses, present at the same time; and such witnesses
shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, and of each other.” W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3
(2015) (emphasis added).
65. See Stevens, 508 S.E.2d at 613 (“[T]here was no evidence of fraud, coercion or undue
influence”).
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Black v. Maxwell, 46 S.E.2d 804, 805 (1948)).
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decedent intended the will to be legally effective.68 Put differently,
the rule of strict compliance prohibits courts from correcting the
false-negative outcomes that the conventional law’s high level of
formality produces. In fact, courts sometimes explicitly acknowl-
edge that the application of the conventional law produces false-
negative outcomes, but they also typically admit that their hands are
tied by the rule of strict compliance.69 For example, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania explains, “It may happen, even frequently,
that genuine wills, namely, wills truly expressing the intentions of
the testators, are made without observation of the required forms;
and whenever that happens, the genuine intention is frus-
trated . . . .”70 Thus, the conventional law of will-execution produces
false-negative outcomes even when the court has ample evidence to
establish that the decedent intended a formally deficient will to be
legally effective.71
All in all, the conventional law of will-execution heavily allocates
probate-error risk in favor of false-negative outcomes. On the one
hand, by requiring the testator to leave behind strong evidence of
testamentary intent in the form a written, signed, and witnessed
will, the conventional law minimizes the likelihood that the court
will validate a will that the decedent did not intend to be legally
effective.72 The risk of a false-positive outcome is therefore ex-
tremely low. On the other hand, under the rule of strict
compliance, the court will not validate a formally deficient will,
even when it is certain that the decedent intended the noncomp-
liant will to be legally effective. In this situation, the court refuses to
validate the will despite the high probability of a false-negative out-
come.73 Consequently, under the conventional law of will-
execution, the risk of false-negative outcomes is much greater than
the risk of false-positive outcomes.
68. Langbein, supra note 3, at 489.
69. See Mann, supra note 50, at 1036 (explaining the courts invalidate wills “sometimes
even while conceding—always ruefully, of course—that the document clearly represents the
wishes and intent of the testator”); see also In re Pavlinko’s Estate, 148 A.2d 528, 528 (Pa.
1959) (describing the invalidation of a will in a situation in which the decedent’s intent was
clear as a “very unfortunate” result).
70. In re Churchill’s Estate, 103 A. 533, 535 (Pa. 1918).
71. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153 (“[B]y establishing a conclusive pre-
sumption of invalidity for an imperfectly executed instrument, the strict compliance rule
denies probate even if the defect is innocuous and there is overwhelming evidence of authen-
ticity—a false negative.”); Lester, supra note 26, at 578 (“In the past, a fear of probating ‘false
positives’ . . . has led to strict compliance with Wills Act formalities and denial of probate for
documents that decedents intended to constitute their wills.”).
72. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
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II. CRITICISM OF THE CONVENTIONAL LAW’S RISK ALLOCATION
The conventional law of will-execution enjoyed a relatively quiet
existence until 1975, when Professor John Langbein published his
article, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act.74 In this seminal
work, Langbein criticizes the conventional law for being overly for-
malistic.75 He argues that the validity of a will depends too much
upon whether the decedent complied with the prescribed formali-
ties and not enough upon whether the decedent intended the will
to be legally effective.76 As a result, too many authentic wills are
invalidated because of honest and harmless mistakes.77
Langbein’s argument is founded upon formality’s underlying
purpose of providing evidence of a will’s authenticity.78 He argues
that requiring the court to invalidate a noncompliant document in
cases in which the decedent clearly intended to execute a will is
unnecessary.79 If the testator’s intent is clear, testamentary formal-
ity’s purpose of providing evidence of the will’s authenticity has
been fulfilled.80 The application of the rule of strict compliance
74. Langbein, supra note 3. The reform movement became so associated with Langbein
that it has been described as the “Langbein Revolution.” Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Require-
ments for Due Execution of Wills: Some Guidance from the Past, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1893, 1896 (1996).
While Langbein sparked widespread reexamination of the conventional law, earlier critiques
can be found. See, e.g., Philip Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IOWA L. REV. 501, 503
(1948) (“[T]he philosophy should be to impose only such requirements as seem so unmistak-
ably essential to a safe will-making process as to justify running the known risk of defeating
meritorious wills through failure of testators to know or comply with the requirements.”);
Recent Case, Probate Denied Husband’s Will When Husband and Wife Each Mistakenly Signed the
Other’s Mutual Will, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1237, 1239–40 (1959) (criticizing “an unnecessarily
literal and unsophisticated construction of the [will-execution] requirements”).
75. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 489 (“The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and
relentless formalism. The Wills Act prescribes a particular set of formalities for executing
one’s testament. The most minute defect in formal compliance is held to void the will, no
matter how abundant the evidence that the defect is inconsequential.”).
76. See id. at 498–503 (“In other areas where legislation imposes formal requirements,
the courts have taken a purposive approach to formal defects . . . . The courts have boasted
that they do not permit formal safeguards to be turned into instruments of injustice in cases
where the purposes of the formalities are independently satisfied. Why has the Wills Act not
been interpreted with a similar purposiveness? There are factors which distinguish Wills Act
defects from [other formal] violations, but we submit that none of them really justifies the
harsher treatment of Wills Act defects.”).
77. See id.; see also Lester, supra note 26, at 578–79.
78. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 491–98.
79. See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on
Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1987).
80. See id.
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and the resulting invalidity of a noncompliant will in such cases un-
dermines the law’s overall objective of effectuating the decedent’s
intent.81
The dissenting judge’s response to the majority opinion in Ste-
vens v. Casdorph illustrates this standard critique of the conventional
law:
The majority once more takes a very technocratic approach to
the law, slavishly worshiping form over substance. In so doing,
they not only create a harsh and inequitable result wholly con-
trary to the indisputable intent of Mr. Homer Haskell Miller,
but also a rule of law that is against the spirit and intent of our
whole body of law relating to the making of wills.82
Langbein’s reaction to cases like Stevens v. Casdorph nicely sum-
marizes a fundamental problem with the conventional law. He
explains that the law of wills “is meant to implement the decedent’s
intent” and that “the paradox in [these] case[s] . . . is that the [con-
ventional law] defeats that intent.”83 Put simply, the conventional
law of will-execution is intended to provide courts evidence of a
will’s authenticity, yet it frequently requires courts to invalidate
clearly authentic wills.
Langbein’s criticism provides a helpful starting point for think-
ing about the inadequacies of the conventional law. His critique
illuminates the inequity that results when the conventional law is
applied in specific cases, and Stevens v. Casdorph exemplifies both
81. See id. at 4; Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The
Search for a Compromise between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 457
(2002) (“[F]ormality rules for will execution prevent mistakes about intent and provide a
means for expressing intent. At the same time, in significant number of cases they may frus-
trate not only an individual testator’s intent but also the principal objective of the law of
wills.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The formalities are meant to facilitate [an] intent-serving
purpose, not to be ends in themselves.”).
82. Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 613 (W.Va. 1998) (Workman, J., dissenting).
The dissent further criticizes the majority opinion: “The majority’s conclusion is . . . [an]
illiberal and inflexible construction, giving preeminence to the letter of the law and ignoring
the spirit of the entire body of testamentary law, resulting in the thwarting of Mr. Miller’s
unequivocal wishes.” Id. at 614.
83. Langbein, supra note 79, at 4; see In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J.
1991) (“Compliance with statutory formalities is important not because of the inherent value
that those formalities possess, but because of the purposes they serve. It would be ironic to
insist on literal compliance with statutory formalities when that insistence would invalidate a
will that is the deliberate and voluntary act of the testator.”).
348 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:2
the high risk of false-negative outcomes that exists under the con-
ventional law and the harshness that can result from such a
probate-error risk allocation.84
However, the inequity of individual cases does not necessarily
render the conventional law ineffective as a method for classifying
wills as authentic or inauthentic. Instead of focusing on the inequity
of particular cases, the law of will-execution must be analyzed as a
broader system for differentiating authentic wills from inauthentic
wills. When viewed from this more general perspective, the relevant
issue is not whether a correct determination of a will’s authenticity
is made in a particular case. Rather, it is whether the system for
evaluating the authenticity of wills is designed to make correct de-
terminations of authenticity as frequently as possible. In other
words, an evaluation of the conventional law of will-execution
should focus on whether the law is designed to minimize the overall
level of probate-error risk.
A. Probate-Error Costs
The goal of probate-error minimization stems from the relative
costs of false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes. If one
type of error is more costly than the other, minimization of the to-
tal number of errors is not necessarily the appropriate goal of the
law. Consider, for example, criminal adjudication. A criminal trial
can produce both false-positive outcomes (i.e., convictions of inno-
cent defendants) and false-negative outcomes (i.e., acquittals of
guilty defendants). Within this context, false-positive outcomes are
widely considered more costly than false-negative outcomes because
society views the acquittal of guilty defendants as more acceptable
than the conviction of innocent persons.85 This evaluation of the
costs of criminal adjudication error is based upon “a moral judg-
ment about the wrongfulness of inflicting the pain of criminal
conviction on people who are not guilty of crimes.”86 Criminal adju-
dication is therefore not designed to minimize the overall risk of
error. Instead, it is designed to minimize false-positive outcomes in
84. See Stevens, 508 S.E.2d 610.
85. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is far worse
to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES 352 (“[T]he law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer.”); see generally Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173
(1997).
86. Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1619, 1688 (2001).
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the form of wrongful convictions, but at the cost of an increased
risk of false-negative outcomes through the acquittal of guilty
defendants.87
Although the criminal adjudication system is not designed to
minimize the total number of errors, the law’s method of determin-
ing the authenticity of wills should be because false-positive
outcomes are generally just as costly as false-negative outcomes
within the probate context. Specifically, the decedent’s freedom of
disposition is undermined not only when the court validates an in-
authentic will but also when the court invalidates an authentic
will.88 If the court validates an inauthentic will, the decedent’s free-
dom of disposition is undermined because the estate passes
according to the terms of a will that the decedent did not intend to
be legally effective.89 Conversely, if the court invalidates an authen-
tic will, the decedent’s freedom of disposition is undermined
because a genuine expression of testamentary intent is ignored.90
Thus, in contrast to criminal adjudication errors,91 probate er-
rors in the form of false-positive outcomes are equally as costly as
probate errors in the form of false-negative outcomes.92 Both types
of probate error place the decedent’s estate in the hands of unin-
tended beneficiaries.93 Because the cost of a false-positive outcome
equals the cost of a false-negative outcome, the law of will-execution
should be designed to minimize overall probate-error risk. Indeed,
as long as the court reaches the correct decision regarding a will’s
authenticity as frequently as possible, the law should be indifferent
to whether the probate errors that occur are false-positive outcomes
or false-negative outcomes. However, as detailed below, the conven-
tional law of will-execution is not designed to minimize the overall
level of probate-error risk. Instead, the law heavily protects against
false-positive outcomes and consequently produces an unnecessa-
rily high overall level of probate-error risk.
87. This allocation of risk is achieved through the reasonable doubt standard of proof.
See Richard A. Bierschback & Alex Stein, Deterrence, Retributivism, and the Law of Evidence, 93
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 189, 191 (2007) (“[B]y decreasing the incidence of false positives (erro-
neous convictions of the factually innocent), a ‘reasonable doubt’ standard increases the
incidence of false negatives (erroneous acquittals and non-prosecutions of the factually
guilty).”); see also infra notes 283–284 and accompanying text.
88. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
92. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 463 (“[A]n erroneous decision upholding an informal
will is [not] substantially more costly than an erroneous decision rejecting an informal will”
because “an error either way results in a disposition the testator does not want.”).
93. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148 (“Both kinds of error dishonor the
decedent’s freedom of disposition.”).
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B. Total Probate-Error Risk
The law of will-execution can allocate probate-error risk along a
spectrum.94 On one end, all probate errors would be false-positive
outcomes. Under such a system, the court would validate a will if
there were any chance that the decedent intended it to be legally
effective.95 On the other end, all probate errors would be false-neg-
ative outcomes. Under such a system, the court would validate a will
only if it were unquestionably authentic. In the middle of the spec-
trum, probate-error risk would be evenly distributed; the number of
false-positive outcomes would be the same as the number of false-
negative outcomes. Between this midpoint and the two extremes
lies an entire spectrum of potential probate-error risk allocations.
Critics argue that the conventional law of will-execution is flawed
because it heavily allocates probate-error risk in favor of false-nega-
tive outcomes.96 At the heart of this critique is the notion that the
law should be designed to correctly determine a will’s authenticity
as frequently as possible. Put differently, because the primary objec-
tive of the law of wills is to dispose of the estate in the way that the
decedent intended,97 the law should minimize the overall risk of
probate errors (i.e., the combined risk of false-positive outcomes
and false-negative outcomes).98 Although critics argue that the con-
ventional law’s preference for false-negative outcomes is
inequitable,99 typically they do not clearly explain why a preference
for false-negative outcomes is inconsistent with the goal of minimiz-
ing probate-error risk.
Although the conventional law’s risk allocation may intuitively
seem problematic, a false-negative heavy risk allocation does not
necessarily undermine the goal of probate-error minimization. For
94. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1521 (2001) (“Systems that operate under uncertainty always balance type I and type II er-
rors—false positives . . . and false negatives.”).
95. Some have argued that this is the appropriate allocation of probate-error risk. See,
e.g., Guzman, supra note 48, at 309 (“Selecting rules that risk over-inclusion by favoring the
identification of testamentary intent—and therefore wills—is the better choice: no one will
die for courts having done so . . . . [R]esponsibility for any marginal misstep in finding
[testamentary intent] would rest appropriately with the decedent who had left evidence to
that effect in the first place.”).
96. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.
97. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
98. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 467 (“The fact that standard will formalities provide . . .
benefits when used by testators does not alter the objective at the point of litigation, which
should be to determine as accurately as possible whether or not the decedent had testamen-
tary intent.”).
99. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 147–150 and accom-
panying text.
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instance, consider a scenario in which formality is not a useful
proxy for authenticity. Under this scenario, the likelihood that a
purported will is authentic is the same as the likelihood that it is
inauthentic regardless of its level of formality. This scenario is illus-
trated by Graph 1 with the level of formality represented along the
x-axis and the number of purported wills represented along the y-
axis. The curved line represents the distribution of both authentic
wills and inauthentic wills across different levels of formality. From
this graph, one can determine the number of purported wills that
possess a certain level of formality.
The point labeled f1 at the far left-hand side of the x-axis repre-
sents an extremely low level of formality, such an oral will.100
Relatively few wills possessing this low level of formality are submit-
ted for probate,101 and therefore the distribution curve indicates
that the number of wills that possess an f1 level of formality falls at
the lower end of the y-axis at the point labeled n1. By contrast, the
point labeled f3 at far right-hand side of the x-axis represents an
extremely high level of formality, such as a written and signed docu-
ment that is attested by five witnesses and is notarized.102 Few wills
likely possess this level of formality, and, as such, the distribution
curve indicates that the number of wills that possess an f3 level of
formality also falls at the lower end of the y-axis at the point labeled
n3. In the middle of the x-axis at the point labeled f2, the level of
formality is higher than an f1 level of formality but is lower than an
f3 level of formality. A will that possesses an f2 level of formality
might resemble a standard will that is written, signed, and attested
by two witnesses. More wills that are submitted for probate likely
possess this intermediate level of formality, and therefore the distri-
bution curve indicates that the number of wills that possess an f2
level of formality falls at the top end of the y-axis at the point la-
beled n2.
100. Some states authorize oral wills (also referred to as nuncupative wills) in limited
circumstances. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148 n.3.
101. See id. (explaining that oral wills are “extremely rare”); Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking
for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 683, 729 (2011) (“Al-
though nuncupative wills can be traced to the origin of wills, the use of nuncupative wills
today is limited.”).
102. Some commentators advise the inclusion of a notary and extra witnesses in the will-
execution ceremony. See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer, Will Contests—Prediction and Prevention, 4 EST.
PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 15, 40 (2011).
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The basic assumption of this model is that the number of authen-
tic wills that possess a certain level of formality is the same as the
number of inauthentic wills that possess that level of formality. Re-
gardless of the level of formality, the relationship between
authentic wills and inauthentic wills remains constant; the number
of authentic wills equals the number of inauthentic wills at any
given level of formality. Although Graph 1 appears to contain a sin-
gle distribution curve, it actually contains two identical overlapping
distribution curves—one representing the distribution of authentic
wills and one representing the distribution of inauthentic wills.
Therefore, at the f1 level of formality, n1 wills are authentic and n1
wills are inauthentic. Likewise, both the number of authentic wills
that possess an f3 level of formality and the number of inauthentic
wills that possess an f3 level of formality is n3. The same is true re-
gardless of the level of formality. Under this model, the level of
formality at which the law chooses to distinguish authentic wills
from inauthentic wills does not affect the total number of probate
errors.
Graph 2 represents a false-negative heavy risk allocation, similar
to the conventional law’s allocation.103 The vertical line represents
the high level of formality that the law uses to differentiate authen-
tic wills from inauthentic wills.104 Purported wills that possess a level
of formality that is left of the differentiating line are classified as
inauthentic, and purported wills that possess a level of formality
that is right of the differentiating line are classified as authentic.
103. See supra Part I.
104. See supra Part I.A.
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Because the single distribution curve represents two separate but
identical distribution curves, one for authentic wills and one for in-
authentic wills, the area to the left of the differentiating line and
under the distribution curve represents both the number of in-
authentic wills that are correctly classified as inauthentic (i.e., true-
negative outcomes) and the number of authentic wills that are in-
correctly classified as inauthentic (i.e., false-negative outcomes).
Similarly, the area to right of the differentiating line and under the
distribution curve represents both the number of true-positive out-
comes and false-positive outcomes. Thus, the model represented in
Graph 2 produces a high risk of false-negative outcomes as repre-
sented by the large area that is labeled FN, but it is offset by a
relatively low risk of false-positive outcomes as represented by the
small area that is labeled FP.
By contrast, Graph 3 represents a false-positive heavy risk alloca-
tion. Instead of the differentiating level of formality falling toward
the right-hand side of the x-axis, the differentiating line is now set
toward the left-hand side of the x-axis where the level of formality is
lower. With this change comes a higher risk of false-positive out-
comes, but again this risk is offset by a relatively low risk of false-
negative outcomes. Thus, in this hypothetical scenario, the overall
risk of probate errors is fixed because formality is not a useful proxy
for authenticity.
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As a comparison of Graphs 2 and 3 reveals, a false-negative heavy
risk allocation produces the same number of probate errors as a
false-positive heavy risk allocation. In other words, the total area
under the distribution curve that represents incorrect determina-
tions of authenticity is the same regardless of how probate-errors
are allocated among false-negative outcomes and false-positive out-
comes. The role of the law of will-execution under this hypothetical
scenario is simply to allocate risk among false-positive outcomes
and false-negatives outcomes. It has no role in affecting overall pro-
bate-error risk, and therefore, a false-negative heavy risk allocation
does not undermine the goal of probate-error minimization.
1. Frequency of Inauthentic Wills
While the hypothetical scenario that is represented by Graphs 1
through 3 is useful for beginning to think about how the law allo-
cates probate-error risk, the scenario does not reflect reality. First,
this model assumes that the number of authentic wills that are sub-
mitted for probate is the same as the number of inauthentic wills
that are submitted for probate. This assumption is in part responsi-
ble for the law’s inability to alter the overall level of probate-error
risk. Because the number of authentic wills is the same as the num-
ber of inauthentic wills at any given level of formality, a change in
the differentiating level of formality results in an equal tradeoff be-
tween false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes.
However, the number of authentic wills that are submitted to pro-
bate is likely not equal to the number of inauthentic wills that are
submitted to probate. Instead, most purported wills are likely
authentic.
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Several factors support this new assumption. First, the vast major-
ity of wills offered for probate pass through the system
uncontested.105 If there were questions regarding the will’s authen-
ticity, some interested party likely would contest the will during the
probate process. Second, most wills that are submitted for probate
possess high levels of formality,106 which as discussed previously,
provides robust evidence of authenticity.107 Third, fraudulent wills
are rare.108 In the past, there was a significant risk that apparently
authentic wills were instead forgeries, but today fraud is signifi-
cantly less prevalent.109 Finally, many scholars suggest that a
significant number of wills that lack high levels of formality are nev-
ertheless authentic.110 Errors in will-execution are frequently
attributed to simple mistake, rather than inauthenticity. Therefore,
although precise measurement of the number of authentic wills
and inauthentic wills that are submitted for probate is impossible, it
seems safe to assume that most wills are authentic.
As seen in Graph 4, the disproportion in the number of authen-
tic and inauthentic wills is illustrated by a lower distribution curve
for inauthentic wills. This change creates two distinct distribution
curves: one that reflects the distribution of authentic wills and an-
other that reflects the distribution of inauthentic wills. These two
distribution curves now illustrate a hypothetical scenario in which
most wills are authentic at any given level of formality. The disparity
between authentic wills and inauthentic wills is most pronounced at
105. See Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Will Contests: Legacies of Aging and Social Change, in INHERI-
TANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA, 173, 174–75 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee
eds., 1998) (reporting will contests “are rare events, occurring in fewer than [three] percent
of probated estates”); Lawrence M. Friedman, Christopher J. Walker & Ben Hernandez-
Stern, The Inheritance Process in San Bernardino County, California, 1964: A Research Note, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 1445, 1467 (2007) (“Every study of the probate process has found that will
contests are quite rare events. . . . [T]he overwhelming majority of estates sail through pro-
bate without any real objection.”); David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1094, 1131 (2015) (reporting only sixteen will contests out of a sample of 571 probate cases).
106. See Horton, supra note 105, at 1131 (reporting that only four wills out of a sample of
571 probate cases were challenged for improper execution); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will-
Contests—An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. & TR. J. 607, 647 (1987) (suggesting that “invali-
dation of wills in will contests on the ground of nonobservance of testamentary formalities is
rare and of minimal significance”).
107. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
108. See James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541,
551 (1990) (“[F]raudulent wills are seldom a problem. If one judges simply from the cases
are denied probate because attestation is botched or absent, extremely few involve the kind
of fraud that the Statute of Frauds was designed to prevent.”).
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 48, at 309 (suggesting that in cases of noncompliance
“[t]estamentary-enough intent more than likely exists”); James Lindgren, The Fall of Formal-
ism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1029 (1992) (explaining that of the many cases involving
attestation errors “[a]lmost all are defective because of ignorance or mistake”).
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the f2 level of formality with the number of authentic wills falling at
the top end of the y-axis at the point labeled n2+ and the number of
inauthentic wills falling in the middle of the y-axis at the point la-
beled n2-. At formality level f1, the disparity is less pronounced with
the number of authentic wills being only slightly greater than the
number of inauthentic wills.
















The decoupling of the distribution curves for authentic wills and
inauthentic wills affects how probate-error risk is depicted. Con-
sider, for example, Graph 5, which sets the level of formality at
which the law distinguishes authentic wills from inauthentic wills in
the middle of the x-axis at the point labeled f3. Wills that fall to the
left of the differentiating line are classified as inauthentic. Thus,
the area left of the differentiating line and under the higher distri-
bution curve for authentic wills represents the number of false-
negative outcomes.111 In other words, the area labeled FN repre-
sents those wills that are authentic but that are incorrectly classified
as inauthentic. By contrast, wills that fall to the right of the differen-
tiating line are classified as authentic, and the area to the right of
the line and under the lower distribution curve for inauthentic wills
represents those wills that are inauthentic but that are incorrectly
classified as authentic.112 As such, the area labeled FP represents the
number of false-positive outcomes. A comparison of the areas la-
beled FN and FP reveals that setting the differentiating line at point
f3 produces more false-negative outcomes than false-positive
outcomes.
111. Similarly, the area to the left of the differentiating line and under the lower distribu-
tion curve for inauthentic wills represents the number of true-negative outcomes.
112. Likewise, the area to the right of the differentiating line and under the higher distri-
bution curve for authentic wills represents the number of true-positive outcomes.
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Because the distribution curves for authentic wills and inauthen-
tic wills are no longer identical under this revised model, the
overall level of probate-error risk is no longer fixed. Now, the law’s
allocation of risk among false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes plays a role in probate-error minimization. As depicted in
Graph 6, when the differentiating line is moved from point f3 to a
lower level of formality at point f2, not only does the allocation of
risk between false-negative outcomes and false-positive outcomes
change, but also the overall level of probate-error risk drops. The
total number of probate-errors decreases because moving the dif-
ferentiating line reduces the number of false-negative outcomes
more than it increases the number of false-positive outcomes. Thus,
when the differentiating line is set at point f2 more false-positive
outcomes are produced than when the differentiating line is set at
point f3, but that increase is offset by a greater decrease in the num-
ber of false-negative outcomes. The smaller combined area of the
FN and FP regions illustrates the lower overall level of probate-error
risk that results from the change in the differentiating line’s
location.
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Although changing the differentiating line’s location from f3 to f2
reduces the overall level of probate-error risk, a greater reduction is
possible. Graph 7 represents a scenario in which the differentiating
line coincides with the y-axis at point f1. Because point f1 represents
a level at which formality is absent, all purported wills are presumed
to be authentic regardless of their level of formality. The entire dis-
tribution curve for both authentic wills and inauthentic wills falls to
the right of the differentiating line, and no purported wills fall to
the left. Consequently, all purported wills are classified as authentic
and all probate errors are false-positive outcomes.













Not only does setting the differentiating line at the y-axis allocate
all probate-error risk in favor of false-positive outcomes, but it also
minimizes overall probate-error risk. Like the move from f3 to f2, the
move from f2 to f1 produces more false-positive outcomes, but that
increase in false-positive outcomes is offset by a greater decrease in
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the number of false-negative outcomes. In sum, allocating all pro-
bate-error risk to false-positive outcomes produces the smallest
possible area below the distribution curves that represent incorrect
determinations of authenticity. As such, this model of probate-error
risk illustrates that a risk allocation that is heavily skewed toward
one type of probate-error is not necessarily inconsistent with the
goal of probate-error minimization. As discussed previously, under
certain conditions, such an allocation does not affect the overall
rate of error, and in fact, under other conditions, such an alloca-
tion can even achieve the goal of probate-error minimization.
2. Formality of Inauthentic Wills
Although recognizing that most wills submitted for probate likely
are authentic brings the probate-error risk model closer to reality,
more refinement is needed. Specifically, the model as currently
constructed assumes that the mean level of formality is the same for
both authentic wills and inauthentic wills. Under this assumption,
the level of formality that most authentic wills possess is the same as
the level of formality that most inauthentic wills possess. This as-
sumption is exemplified by formality level f2 on previous Graph 4.
Formality level f2 is the level of formality that most authentic wills
possess (i.e., n2+ wills), and it is also the level of formality that most
inauthentic wills possess (i.e., n2- wills). Because f2 is the mean level
of formality for both authentic and inauthentic wills, the number of
both authentic wills and inauthentic wills decreases as the level of
formality decreases along the left-hand side of the x-axis. Likewise,
as the level of formality increases toward the right of formality level
f2, the number of authentic wills decreases and the number of in-
authentic wills decreases.
The assumption that the mean level of formality is the same for
both authentic wills and inauthentic wills is flawed. Instead, the
mean level of formality of inauthentic wills is likely lower than the
mean level of formality of authentic wills. Most authentic wills likely
possess a relatively high level of formality simply because the law
requires valid wills to possess a high level of formality. By mandat-
ing that a valid will be written, signed, witnessed, and compliant
with various other requirements, the law encourages those wanting
to leave behind valid wills to comply with a high level of formality.113
113. See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597, 625
(2014) (“[B]y requiring all testators to complete the formal will-execution process, the [con-
ventional law] encourages those who desire to distribute their property through wills to
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Therefore, most authentic wills possess the high level of formality
that the conventional law requires. By contrast, most inauthentic
wills likely possess a relatively low level of formality. Highly formal
inauthentic wills are rare because most people do not complete a
complex will-execution ceremony without intending to leave be-
hind a legally effective will.114 Furthermore, as previously discussed,
fraud is no longer a significant problem, and consequently few
forged wills, which possess high levels of formality, are submitted
for probate.115 Most inauthentic wills therefore possess a level of
formality that is lower than the level of formality that most authen-
tic wills possess.
The different mean levels of formality for authentic and in-
authentic wills are represented in Graph 8 by two offset distribution
curves. The distribution curve that represents inauthentic wills is
situated toward the left-hand side of the x-axis where formality
levels are lower, and the mean level of formality is represented by
formality level f1. By contrast, the distribution curve that represents
authentic wills is situated toward the right-hand side of the x-axis
reflecting higher levels of formality. Because the distribution curve
for authentic wills is shifted toward the right-hand side of the x-axis,
the mean level of formality is located to the right of formality level
f1 at point f2. Thus, Graph 8 depicts a probate-error risk model in
which not only are inauthentic wills less common than authentic
wills but also inauthentic wills are on average less formal than au-
thentic wills.
comply with the prescribed will-execution formalities.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and In-
consistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1066 (1996) (“[T]he very fact that the law demands
formalities should function ex ante to encourage proper execution and hence yield, in more
instances, better evidence both of the substance of the estate plan and of the testator’s re-
solve to put it into legal effect.”); see also infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text. Even in
jurisdictions that authorize less formal holographic wills, empirical evidence suggests that
informal authentic wills are rare. See Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of
Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 27, 42 (2008) (re-
porting that of the “approximately 10,000 estates [that] submitted an application for probate
[in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania] during 1990 and 1995 collectively,” only “145 contained
holographic testaments”).
114. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153. But see infra notes 127–130 and ac-
companying text.
115. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
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Recognizing that the mean level of formality for inauthentic wills
is lower than the mean level of formality for authentic wills affects
both the allocation of risk between false-positive outcomes and
false-negative outcomes and the overall level of probate-error risk.
Consider, for example, Graph 9, which depicts the conventional
law’s false-negative heavy risk allocation.116 The differentiating level
of formality is set toward the right-hand side of the x-axis at a rela-
tively high level of formality. Specifically, the differentiating line is
set at a level of formality that represents a written, signed, and at-
tested document that also satisfies the ancillary requirements of
presence, publication, and subscription.117
Because the mean level of formality for inauthentic wills lies sig-
nificantly to the left of the differentiating line, many inauthentic
wills are correctly classified as inauthentic, and very few false-posi-
tive outcomes are produced. The small number of inauthentic wills
that are incorrectly classified as authentic is represented by the
small area to the right of the differentiating line that is labeled FP.
By contrast, the mean level of formality for authentic wills lies
slightly to the right of the differentiating line. Consequently, a
smaller percentage of authentic wills is classified as inauthentic, and
more false-negative outcomes are produced. The relatively large
area to the left of the differentiating line that is labeled FN repre-
sents the greater number of authentic wills that are incorrectly
classified as inauthentic. Thus, when the differentiating level of for-
mality is set toward the right-hand side of the x-axis, as it is under
the conventional law of will-execution, the risk of false-negative out-
comes is greater than the risk of false-positive outcomes.
116. See supra Part I.
117. See supra Part I.A.
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As explained previously, a false-negative heavy risk allocation is
not necessarily inconsistent with the goal of probate-error minimi-
zation.118 However, such an allocation does undermine this goal
under a model in which most purported wills are authentic and the
mean level of formality of inauthentic wills is lower than the mean
level of formality of authentic wills. For example, consider a scena-
rio in which the differentiating level of formality is set lower than
the conventional law’s differentiating level of formality. As depicted
in Graph 10, this change in the differentiating line’s location to-
ward the left-hand side of the x-axis affects both the allocation of
risk between false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes
and the overall level of probate-error risk.
The shift in the differentiating line’s location toward the left de-
creases the number of false-negative outcomes. But because of the
differences in the distribution curves for authentic and inauthentic
wills, the tradeoff between false-negative outcomes and false-posi-
tive outcomes is not one-for-one. Instead, false-negative outcomes
decrease at a greater rate than false-positive outcomes increase.
Consequently, moving to a lower differentiating level of formality
decreases the overall risk of probate-errors. Comparing Graph 9
and Graph 10 shows this decline in the total risk of false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes, as the combined area of the
FN and FP regions in Graph 10 is smaller than the combined pro-
bate-error regions in Graph 9.
118. See supra Part II.B.1.
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In sum, the conventional law of will-execution is not designed to
minimize the overall likelihood of probate errors. Instead, it
reduces the risk of false-positive outcomes at the expense of an in-
creased risk of false-negative outcomes. As Graphs 9 and 10
illustrate, because inauthentic wills are both less prevalent and typi-
cally less formal than authentic wills, a false-negative heavy risk
allocation produces more total probate errors than would an alloca-
tion that more evenly distributes probate errors between false-
positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes. The conventional
law’s preference for false-negative outcomes and its consequent
overproduction of total probate errors is inappropriate because the
cost of a false-positive outcome is the same as the cost of a false-
negative outcome.119 When a probate error occurs, whether in the
form of a false-positive outcome or a false-negative outcome, the
decedent’s intent is undermined.120 Therefore, contrary to the way
that the conventional law operates, the method for determining a
will’s authenticity should be designed to make correct determina-
tions as frequently as possible.
C. Correction of False-Positive Outcomes
Most of the discussion regarding the conventional law of will-exe-
cution centers on the effect of a testator’s failure to comply with the
prescribed formalities. Under the conventional rule of strict com-
pliance, the only way that a proponent of a will can establish
testamentary intent is by proving that the testator complied with the
119. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
120. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148.
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prescribed formalities.121 Noncompliance is conclusive evidence
that the decedent did not intend a will to be legally effective,122 and
consequently the court has no discretion to correct obvious false-
negative outcomes.123 The bulk of the criticism of the conventional
law therefore focuses on the harshness of invalidating a clearly gen-
uine will because of a harmless formal defect.124 But the effect of a
decedent’s noncompliance is only part of the law of will-execution.
Relatively little attention has been paid to how the law operates
when the decedent complies with the prescribed formalities.
Under conventional law, a decedent’s formal compliance is not
conclusive evidence of the existence of testamentary intent.125 Even
if a decedent strictly complies with the prescribed formalities, a
contestant of the will can submit evidence showing that the dece-
dent did not intend the will to be legally effective.126 A group of
cases dealing with the execution of wills by initiates of the Masonic
order illustrate how this rebuttable presumption of testamentary in-
tent operates.127 In these cases, the Masonic order required
Freemasonry candidates to execute wills as part of their initiation
ceremony.128 Because these wills strictly complied with the pre-
scribed will-execution formalities, the court presumed that the
Masonic initiates intended them to be legally effective.129 However,
121. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
122. See DUKEMINIER & STIKOFF, supra note 1, at 153.
123. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.
125. See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of
Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 541–42 (1982) (“Even
the formalities for attested wills are common enough to other types of legal documents, and
instruments that have nothing to do with testation could be said to comply with the Wills Act.
It is the requirement of testamentary intent that prevents such things from qualifying as
wills.”).
126. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 8252(a) (West 2015) (“The contestants of the will have
the burden of proof of lack of testamentary intent . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-12-407
(2015) (“Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary
intent . . . .”).
127. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 125, at 542 n.75; C. Douglas Miller, Will For-
mality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code
“Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, Part One: The Wills Act Formula, the
Rite of Testation, and the Question of Intent: A Problem in Search of a Solution, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167,
275–76 (1991); see, e.g., Vickery v. Vickery, 170 So. 745, 745 (Fla. 1936); In re Watkin’s Estate,
198 P. 721, 721 (Wash. 1921); Shiels v. Shiels, 109 S.W.2d 1112, 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
128. See Vickery, 170 So. at 745 (“One of the qualifications for membership in the Scot-
tish Rite Masonry is that every candidate, prior to his being taken into the order, is required
to execute his last will and testament, in the event he has not already prior thereto duly made
his will.”); Watkin’s Estate, 198 P. at 721 (“It was testified by members of the order that the
making of a will was a part of the ceremony of the particular degree, required of all candi-
dates who had not theretofore made a will.”).
129. See, e.g., Vickery, 170 So. at 746 (explaining that a will “should be presumed to have
been made with testamentary intent when appearing to have been executed with required
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contestants of the wills were allowed to present evidence that the
candidates did not complete the will-execution ceremony because
they intended to leave behind legally effective wills; instead the evi-
dence suggested that they completed the will-execution ceremony
only because they were obligated to do so as part of their initiation
rite.130
As the Masonic Order cases illustrate,131 under the conventional
law of will-execution formal compliance raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption of testamentary intent.132 But as the previously discussed
case of Stevens v. Casdorph illustrates,133 noncompliance provides
conclusive evidence of the absence of testamentary intent.134 Put
differently, the conventional law provides courts discretion to cor-
rect false-positive outcomes when extrinsic evidence suggests that
the decedent did not intend a formally compliant will to be legally
effective. For instance, the courts in the Masonic will cases were
able to decide whether relying upon formal compliance as a proxy
for the decedent’s intent would produce false-positive outcomes.135
Conversely, the conventional law denies courts the discretion to
correct false-negative outcomes when extrinsic evidence suggests
that the decedent intended a non-compliant document to be a le-
gally effective will. For example, the dissent in Stevens v. Casdorph
lamented that the invalidation of the clearly authentic will in the
case at hand was “patently absurd,”136 yet the court was unable to
correct the obvious false-negative outcome by recognizing the
noncompliant will as legally effective.137
legal formalities” but when “uncertainty and doubt is . . . shown to have surrounded the
supposed making and execution of the alleged will” the probate judge can “refus[e] to allow
such doubtful will to probate as the testamentary act of the alleged testator”).
130. See, e.g., Watkin’s Estate, 198 P. at 722 (describing the testimony of one witness who
testified that the decedent, after executing the purported will, remarked, “That is quite a
josh”); Shiels, 109 S.W.2d at 1113 (describing that the decedent “protested and said that he
did not want to make a will, that he did not have anything to make a will for”).
131. These cases have been labeled the “sham will cases.” Langbein & Waggoner, supra
note 125, at 541.
132. See id. at 541–42.
133. 508 S.E.2d 610 (W. Va. 1998); see supra notes 56–67 and accompanying text.
134. See DUKEMINIER & STIKOFF, supra note 1, at 153; see also supra Part I.B.
135. See, e.g., Shiels, 109 S.W.2d at 1113 (“Testamentary intent on the part of the maker is
essential to constitute an instrument a will, regardless of its correctness in form. And the issue
of such intention is not limited to the language of the instrument alone. The facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding its execution may be looked to in determining whether the maker
intended it to be a testamentary disposition of his property or merely to be used for some
other purpose.”); see also Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N.E. 499, 499–500 (Mass. 1904) (“We are of
[the] opinion that it is competent to contradict by parol the solemn statements contained in
an instrument that it is a will; that it has been signed as such by the person named as the
testator, and attested and subscribed by persons signing as witnesses.”).
136. Stevens, 508 S.E.2d at 615 (Workman, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 613.
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If the risk of false-positive outcomes were higher than the risk of
false-negative outcomes, then the conventional law’s grant of discre-
tion to probate courts to correct false-positive outcomes might be
appropriate. Under such a scenario, court discretion to correct
false-positive outcomes would counterbalance the uneven distribu-
tion of probate-error risk between false-positive outcomes and false-
negative outcomes. But, as described above, the conventional law
does not produce a higher risk of false-positive outcomes. In fact, as
depicted by previous Graph 9, the risk of false-positives is much
lower than the risk of false-negative outcomes.138 As such, the con-
ventional law counter-intuitively grants courts the discretion to
correct probate errors in situations in which the risk of error is low,
but denies courts the ability to correct probate errors when the risk
of error is relatively high.
Because formal compliance with the prescribed will-execution
formalities provides such strong evidence of the decedent’s intent
that a will be legally effective, the likelihood of a false-positive out-
come is extremely low.139 Consequently, courts seldom need to use
the discretion that the conventional law grants them to correct
false-positive outcomes. Indeed, in addition to the Masonic wills
cases,140 few other cases exist in which courts question whether the
decedent intended a formally attested will to be legally effective.141
Conversely, because the risk of false-negative outcomes is greater
than the risk of false-positive outcomes,142 courts would have a
much greater opportunity to reduce the number of probate errors
if they could correct obvious false-negative outcomes. Stevens v. Cas-
dorph is merely one of many cases in which the great weight of the
evidence suggests that the decedent intended a noncompliant will
to be legally effective.143 Thus, many probate errors could be
avoided if courts could correct the obvious false-negative outcomes
that occur in cases like Stevens v. Casdorph.
138. See supra Part I.
139. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153.
140. See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N.E. 499 (Mass. 1904) (involving a will that was
purportedly drafted and executed not with the intent that the document be legally effective
but with the intent to induce the sole beneficiary to engage in a sexual relationship with the
testator); Miller, supra note 127, at 275 (describing as “exceptional” the “cases in which extrin-
sic evidence . . . is admitted to controvert the validity of a properly executed and attested
will”).
142. See supra notes 51 and accompanying text.
143. See Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610 (W. Va. 1998); see also In re Churchill’s Estate,
103 A. 533, 535 (Pa. 1918) (“It may happen, even frequently, that genuine wills, namely, wills
truly expressing the intentions of the testators, are made without observation of the required
forms”) (internal citations omitted).
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In sum, the conventional law’s allocation of probate-error risk is
inappropriate not only because it produces unnecessary probate er-
rors by initially allocating risk heavily in favor of false-negative
outcomes,144 but also by denying courts the ability to correct obvi-
ous false-negative outcomes. Many probate errors could be avoided
if courts could correct obvious false-negative outcomes, but the con-
ventional law denies courts this discretion. Courts’ inability to
correct obvious false-negative outcomes appears particularly egre-
gious when one considers that courts can correct false-positive
outcomes.145 The conventional law’s authorization of courts to cor-
rect false-positive outcomes is not inherently inappropriate, but it
has little benefit. Indeed, the conventional law’s authorization of
courts to correct false-positive outcomes does not significantly re-
duce probate-error risk because the risk of false-positive outcomes is
extremely low and therefore courts have little opportunity to cor-
rect such errors.146
III. MINIMIZING PROBATE-ERROR RISK THROUGH REFORM
After persuasively arguing that the conventional law produces ob-
vious false-negative outcomes, Langbein concludes that such results
are “mistaken,”147 “needless,”148 and “embarrassing.”149 Langbein’s
exasperation is perhaps clearest when he proclaims, “[W]e should
shudder that we still inflict upon our citizens the injustice of the
traditional law.”150 From Langbein’s criticism, a reform movement
has emerged that seeks to reduce the number of authentic wills that
are invalidated because of noncompliance with the prescribed for-
malities. Numerous scholars have joined this call for change,151
while few have argued for maintaining the conventional law.152
144. See supra Part II.A.
145. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text.
147. Langbein, supra note 3, at 489.
148. Id.
149. Langbein, supra note 79, at 54.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 26, at 578–79; Lindgren, supra note 108, at 541–43; Bruce
H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 59–60
(1985). In this regard, Professor Lawrence Waggoner, as the reporter for both the UPC and
the Restatement (Third) of Property, has been instrumental in the push for reform. See Law-
rence W. Waggoner, Why I Do Law Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 731–34 (2012). Many
of the reform movement’s proposals have been adopted by the UPC and the Restatement,
and consequently both have been tools for reform. See, e.g., id. at 732 n.24.
152. But see, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 74; John V. Orth, Wills Act Formalities: How Much
Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 75 (2008).
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To achieve its goal of validating more authentic wills, the reform
movement has proposed two avenues for change. First, the formal-
ity of the will-execution process could be refined.153 Proposals to
change the prescribed formalities are designed to make formal de-
fects less likely by minimizing the formal burdens of will-execution.
Therefore fewer authentic wills would fail because of simple mis-
takes.154 Second, the way that courts evaluate a decedent’s
compliance with the prescribed formalities could change.155 If
courts focused less on formal compliance and more on testamen-
tary intent, they could excuse formal defects in situations in which
the decedent clearly intended to execute a legally effective will.156
These avenues of reform could undoubtedly avoid some of the
inequitable results that occur when a court invalidates clearly au-
thentic wills. However, as previously explained, an analysis of the
law of will-execution must focus not on the outcomes of individual
cases but on the law’s broader system of differentiating authentic
wills from inauthentic wills.157 Because of the evidentiary difficulties
of probate,158 no method of evaluating a will’s authenticity is infalli-
ble.159 Under any system, probate errors will occur. But once the
inevitability of probate errors is recognized, the issue becomes how
the law can minimize the frequency with which they occur. Reform
of the law of will-execution should therefore be evaluated with re-
spect to how specific proposals affect the overall level of probate-
error risk. When the law is viewed in this way, policymakers should
implement reform proposals that increase the frequency of correct
determinations of authenticity. By contrast, they should dismiss pro-
posals that increase the overall level of probate-error risk.
Although reform that avoids the inequitable cases upon which
critics of the conventional law typically focus would certainly reduce
the number of false-negative outcomes, such change would not nec-
essarily reduce the overall level of probate-error risk. As one leading
casebook explains, the question is “whether relaxing the number of
formalities, relaxing the exactness with which those formalities
must be complied, or both might reduce the rate of false negatives
without increasing the rate of false positives.”160 If the elimination
153. See Fellows, supra note 9, at 615.
154. See id. at 614.
155. See Lester, supra note 26, at 579–82.
156. See id.
157. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
159. See Guzman, supra note 48, at 309 (“Where perfection is unattainable, this ‘hard
place’ ‘between over- or under-inclusion errors’ is familiar yet frighteningly irreversible.”).
160. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153. Elsewhere the casebook explains: “The
challenge is to prescribe a set of formalities, and a rule for the exactness with which those
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of some false-negative outcomes produces no increased risk of false-
positive outcomes, reform would decrease the total number of pro-
bate errors. Attempts to reduce the risk of false-negative outcomes,
however, likely come with at least some increased risk of false-posi-
tive outcomes. But as long as the risk of false-negative outcomes
decreases more than the risk of false-positive outcomes increases,
reform will result in overall fewer probate errors.
Because the debate surrounding will-execution reform is not typ-
ically framed in terms of risk allocation, no systematic discussion
has taken place regarding how the refined formality and relaxed
compliance reform strategies alter the allocation of false-positive
outcomes and false-negative outcomes. Consequently, the reform
movement has not clearly explained how their reform proposals
would affect the overall level of probate-error risk. This Part there-
fore develops a framework for thinking about how will-execution
reform can minimize probate-error risk so that the law achieves the
goal of fulfilling the decedent’s intent as frequently as possible.
With this framework in place, the benefits of reform become
clearer and consequently policymakers might be more willing to
implement change.
A. Formal Allocation of Errors
The first avenue of reform is to refine the formality of will-execu-
tion.161 As the complexity of the prescribed formalities increases,
the will-execution process provides greater evidence of a will’s au-
thenticity, which reduces the risk of false-positive outcomes.
However, the risk of false-negative outcomes increases because
more decedents leave behind formally deficient wills that they
nonetheless intended to be legally effective. In this way, a highly
formalized will-execution process poses a decreased risk of false-
positive outcomes and an increased risk of false-negative outcomes.
By contrast, a will-execution process that entails a lower level of
formality results in a lower risk of false-negative outcomes and an
increased risk of false-positive outcomes. On the one hand, with
some of the potential stumbling blocks removed, decedents who
intend to leave behind legally effective wills more likely complete
formalities must be complied, that balances the risk of probating an inauthentic will with the
risk of denying probate to an authentic will.” Id. at 147–48.
161. See Fellows, supra note 9, at 615.
370 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:2
the will-execution process successfully.162 On the other hand, for-
mal compliance provides less assurance that the decedent intended
to execute a valid will,163 which increases the likelihood of false pos-
itive outcomes. Therefore, because the formality of will-execution
allocates probate-error risk between false-positive outcomes and
false-negative outcomes, policymakers can reallocate risk by refin-
ing the prescribed formality.164
In this regard, the reform movement has suggested many ways
that the conventional will-execution formalities could be changed,
as each of the primary formalities of writing, signature, and attesta-
tion has been the subject of numerous reform proposals.165
Specific proposals can be separated into two general categories. Re-
fined formality proposals that fall within the first category focus on
the will-execution ceremony’s overall level of formality.166 For in-
stance, the UPC has eliminated many of the ancillary requirements
of the conventional law, such as the presence and publication re-
quirements.167 By eliminating these requirements, the UPC reduces
the prescribed level of formality for valid will-execution.
Reform proposals that fall within the second category focus on
the breadth of the prescribed formality.168 In contrast to simply al-
tering the conventional level of formality, a refined formality
reform proposal can authorize alternative methods of will-execu-
tion. For example, in addition to recognizing attested wills as valid,
the UPC also recognizes wills that are notarized but not attested as
legally effective.169 By authorizing notarized wills, the UPC broad-
ens the types of formality with which decedents can comply to
execute valid wills.
The stated goal of both categories of refined formality reform is
to make the will-execution process easier so that fewer mistakes are
162. See id. at 614.
163. See id. at 615 (“The state’s willingness to reduce formalities stems from its willingness
to infer from fewer objective facts a property owner’s deliberate and final intent to make a
will.”).
164. See Lindgren, supra note 108, at 546 (“Too many required formalities frustrate the
wishes of testators who fail to meet them. Too few formalities do not give us reliable enough
evidence of what the testator wanted.”).
165. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (eliminating the
subscription and publication requirements); Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond
the Guttenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 121–35
(2008) (proposing a Model Electronic Wills Act); Lindgren, supra note 108, at 542 (propos-
ing the elimination of the attestation requirement).
166. See infra Part III.A.1.
167. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502.
168. See infra Part III.A.2.
169. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502; see also infra notes 195–201 and accompanying text.
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made and consequently fewer authentic wills are invalidated be-
cause of harmless formal defects.170 But again, policymakers should
not focus solely on the reduced risk of false-negative outcomes.171
Instead, they should evaluate refined formality strategies according
to how specific proposals affect the overall level of probate-error
risk. Although refining the formality of will-execution might reduce
the risk of false-negative outcomes, it could also increase the risk of
false-positive outcomes. Reforms that reduce the combined risk of
false-positive outcomes and false-negative outcomes should be im-
plemented. Proposals that increase the total number of probate
errors should be rejected.
1. Level of Formality
The first element of a refined formality reform strategy is the will-
execution process’s overall level of formality. Consider for example
the UPC’s proposal to eliminate many of the technical details of the
general attestation formality, such as the presence and publication
requirements.172 The elimination of these technicalities both reallo-
cates risk among false-positive outcomes and false-negative
outcomes and reduces the overall frequency of probate errors.173
Because the elimination of these requirements makes the will-exe-
cution process less formal and therefore easier to complete,
decedents who intend to execute legally effective wills are more
likely to comply with the prescribed formalities and fewer false-neg-
ative outcomes will result. Moreover, the risk of false-positive
outcomes will not significantly increase because the elimination of
these technical details represents only a small decrease in the con-
ventional law’s level of formality. Even without the publication and
presence requirements, will-execution provides strong evidence
that the decedent intended the will to be legally effective. The elim-
ination of these technicalities therefore likely reduces overall
170. See Fellows, supra note 9, at 614 (“The reduction in legal formalities minimizes the
number of cases in which property owners take actions indicating that they probably intend
to a make a donative transfer, but, nevertheless, fail to meet the formalities because they are
unadvised or ill-advised by their attorneys.”).
171. See supra notes 84–90, 157–160 and accompanying text.
172. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502; see also id. § 2-502 cmt. (“The formalities for execu-
tion of a witnessed will have been reduced to a minimum. . . . The intent is to validate wills
which meet the minimal formalities of the statute.”).
173. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 511 (explaining that “the draftsmen [undoubtedly]
balanced the injustice brought about by technical violations of the publication and presence
requirements and decided that the incremental cautionary value of those two former requi-
sites was not worth the price in wills invalidated for defective compliance”).
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probate-error risk because the risk of false-negative outcomes de-
creases by a greater amount than the risk of false-positive outcomes
increases.
Graph 11 illustrates the elimination of these ancillary require-
ments that are associated with the general attestation formality. The
vertical line located at point f2 on the x-axis represents the conven-
tional law’s differentiating level of formality, which includes the
publication and presence requirements. The vertical line located at
point f1 represents a differentiating level of formality that does not
include the technical requirements of attestation. Because the elim-
ination of these technicalities results in a marginally lower overall
level of formality, the shift from formality level f2 to formality level f1
moves the differentiating line slightly toward the left-hand side of
the x-axis. This reduction in the prescribed level of formality both
reduces the risk of false-negative outcomes and increases the risk of
false-positive outcomes. However, the shift from f2 to f1 reduces the
risk of false-negative outcomes more than it increases the risk of
false-positive outcomes.












elimination of  technicalities
The area labeled FP represents the number of false-positive out-
comes that are produced when the publication and presence
requirements are eliminated. By contrast, the area labeled FN rep-
resents the number of false-negative outcomes that are produced
after the change in formality. When the differentiating level of for-
mality is shifted from f2 to f1, the area representing false-negative
outcomes decreases by a greater amount than the area representing
false-positive outcomes increases. As such, the change in the differ-
entiating level of formality reduces the overall level of probate-error
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risk. Because total probate-error risk is decreased, the UPC’s elimi-
nation of the publication and presence requirements represents a
beneficial refined formality reform proposal.
Although it seems clear that the UPC’s elimination of some tech-
nical details likely would reduce the risk of false-negative outcomes
without substantially increasing the risk of false-positive outcomes,
the effect of more drastic reductions of formality is less clear. For
example, Professor James Lindgren proposes the complete elimina-
tion of the attestation requirement.174 He argues that “[b]y
continuing to insist on attestation, our current legal system does
not protect testators from others,” but “[i]nstead, it protects many
testators from effectuating their own estate plans.”175 Because the
attestation requirement undermines testamentary intent by invali-
dating wills that were clearly intended to be legally effective,176
Lindgren concludes that the attestation requirement should be
abolished.177
Under such a reform, the risk of false-negative outcomes would
certainly be reduced because no authentic will would fail due to an
attestation error.178 However, the risk of false-positive outcomes
would increase because an unattested writing provides less evidence
that the decedent intended the document to be a legally effective
will. Some believe that this increased risk of false-positive outcomes
would not be significant,179 but the net effect of the elimination of
the attestation requirement is certainly less clear than the results
produced by more modest reductions of formality.
Graphs 12 and 13 illustrate the elimination of the attestation re-
quirement. The vertical line located at point f3 represents the
conventional law’s high differentiating level of formality. Whether
the elimination of the attestation requirement reduces the total
number of probate errors depends upon how far such a reduction
of formality pushes the differentiating line toward the left-hand side
174. Lindgren, supra note 108, at 542; see Lindgren, supra note 110, at 1016.
175. Lindgren, supra note 108, at 573.
176. See Lindgren, supra note 110, at 1016 (“There have been several thousand American
appellate opinions on the attestation requirement alone—case reports that should leave any
neutral observer wondering whether anything worthwhile is being accomplished.”).
177. See id.; Lindgren, supra note 108, at 542.
178. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 889 (explaining that if the attestation requirement were
abolished “there would no longer be any Type II errors as a result of defects in attestation
because lack of attestation would not prevent probate of a document that otherwise is a valid
will”).
179. See id. at 890 (“[I]t seems unlikely that most formal wills, at least as currently drafted,
would be seen as anything other than a ‘virtually unmistakable testamentary act,’ even with-
out attestation.”); Langbein, supra note 3, at 498 (“Writing and signature are the minimum
requirements which assure the finality, accuracy and authenticity of purported testamentary
expressions.”).
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of the x-axis. For example, if the elimination of the attestation re-
quirement pushes the differentiating line to point f2, as depicted in
Graph 12, the reform would reduce the overall risk of probate error
because more false-negative outcomes are avoided than false-posi-
tive outcomes are produced. However, as depicted in Graph 13, if
the elimination of the attestation formality pushes the differentiat-
ing line farther to the left, such as to point f1, the net effect of the
tradeoff between false-negative outcomes and false-positive out-
comes becomes less clear. Thus, because the elimination of the
attestation requirement is a substantial reduction in the will-execu-
tion process’s overall level of formality, the reform’s net effect on
total probate-error risk is uncertain.
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In addition to the uncertain tradeoff between false-positive out-
comes and false-negative outcomes, another issue with a substantial
reduction of formality is the potential effect on the distribution of
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both authentic and inauthentic wills. As discussed previously, it is
likely that more authentic wills are submitted for probate than in-
authentic wills, and authentic wills, on average, possess a higher
level of formality than inauthentic wills.180 These two characteristics
of the distribution of authentic and inauthentic wills cause the con-
ventional law’s false-negative heavy risk allocation to produce an
unnecessarily high overall risk of probate errors.181
The elimination of the attestation requirement could affect the
distribution of both authentic wills and inauthentic wills, which in
turn could increase the overall level of probate-error risk. One rea-
son authentic wills possess a high level of formality is simply that the
law requires valid wills to possess a high level of formality. By man-
dating that valid wills be written, signed, and attested, the
conventional law encourages those who want to leave behind legally
effective wills to comply with these formalities.182 By eliminating the
attestation requirement, reform could reduce the decedent’s incen-
tive to leave behind attested wills.183 With this incentive eliminated,
the mean level of formality for authentic wills could decrease over
time. This change is illustrated in Graph 14, which depicts a shift in
the distribution curve for authentic wills toward the left-hand side
of the x-axis.
The elimination of the attestation requirement could also affect
the distribution of inauthentic wills. One purpose of will formalities
is to protect against fraud,184 and the attestation requirement serves
this purpose by making forgery of a will more difficult.185 By increas-
ing the likelihood that a forged will is discovered as a fraud during
probate, the attestation requirement disincentivizes attempts of
fraud.186 When wrongdoers know that a successful attempt at fraud
will be unlikely or difficult, they have less reason to attempt fraud in
180. See supra notes 105–115 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. See Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should be Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 589, 610 (2006) (“By pretending to have a penalty default rule of denying probate to
unattested wills, we encourage people to use witnesses.”); see also Hirsch, supra note 113, at
1066.
183. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 890 (“One argument in favor of retaining the attestation
requirement is that attestation may create better incentives for testators ex ante.”); Lindgren,
supra note 110, at 1026 (“[T]he main argument for retaining the attestation requirement is
that we want to encourage attestation.”).
184. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 32, at 9–13; Langbein, supra note 3, at 496–97.
185. See Glover, supra note 113, at 617–18.
186. See STEWART E. STERK, MELANIE B. LESLIE & JOEL C. DOBRIS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 228
(4th ed. 2011) (suggesting that “the presence of witnesses . . . makes[s] scoundrels think
twice”); Sherwin, supra note 81, at 456 (explaining that formalities “serve a protective func-
tion by reducing the possibility that wrongdoers might interfere with the process of
execution”).
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the first place. If the attestation requirement were eliminated, fraud
would be easier because wrongdoers would not have to persuade
the court that a purported will was genuinely attested. Conse-
quently, wrongdoers may be more inclined to attempt to pass
fraudulent wills through the probate system.187 Thus, over time the
distribution of inauthentic wills could change. In addition to the
potential shift of the distribution curve for authentic wills, Graph 14
illustrates the potential change in the distribution curve for in-
authentic wills. Specifically, with a shift upward toward the top of
the y-axis, the distribution curve now reflects increased rates of in-
authentic wills.









shift in authentic wills?
increase in  
inauthentic wills?
These changes in the way authentic and inauthentic wills are dis-
tributed could increase overall probate-error risk. Because the
distribution curve for inauthentic wills now more closely resembles
the distribution curve for authentic wills, formal compliance be-
comes a less accurate proxy for authenticity. As seen in previous
Graphs 2 and 3, when the two distribution curves are identical, the
law plays a role in allocating risk between false-positive outcomes
and false-negative outcomes, but less accurately classifies a will as
authentic or inauthentic.188 Consequently, when the distribution
curve for inauthentic wills moves closer to the curve for authentic
wills, total probate-error risk increases.
Because the possible adjustments in the way that wills are distrib-
uted across levels of formality are based upon unverifiable
assumptions, these changes are not inevitable. As Professor Daniel
187. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 891 (“[I]f attestation were abolished, more wrongdoers
might attempt to engage in fraud, thereby reviving the relevance of the protective func-
tion.”); supra Part I.
188. See supra Graphs 2 & 3.
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Kelly explains, “The continuing relevance of attestation . . . de-
pends to a certain extent on predictions about how testators,
potential wrongdoers, and others are likely to act if attestation were
abolished.”189 But while these changes might not occur if the attes-
tation requirement were eliminated, the possibility of these changes
creates uncertainty regarding the effect that reform will have on
overall probate-error risk. The uncertainty regarding how individu-
als will react to reform, together with the uncertainty regarding the
tradeoff between false-positive outcomes and false-negative out-
comes,190 renders substantial decreases in the prescribed level of
will-execution formality less attractive than more modest reform
proposals.
In sum, policymakers can reallocate the risk of probate errors by
adjusting the will-execution process’s level of formality. Some re-
duction of formality would likely reduce the total number of
probate errors because the risk of false-negative outcomes would
decrease more than the risk of false-positive outcomes would in-
crease.191 By contrast, the effect of drastic reductions in formality is
less clear because the decrease in false-negative outcomes is likely
accompanied by a more substantial increase in false-positive out-
comes.192 Thus, it seems clear that policymakers should implement
relatively minor reforms like the UPC’s elimination of the technical
requirements of attestation.193 But it remains uncertain whether
policymakers should implement major reforms, like Lindgren’s
proposal to eliminate the attestation requirement.194 However, with
the role that the level of formality plays in allocating probate errors
clearly articulated, policymakers can select a level that they believe
strikes the appropriate balance between false-positive outcomes and
false-negative outcomes.
2. Breadth of Formality
The second component of a refined formality reform strategy is
the breadth of the prescribed formalities. Allowing decedents to
comply with multiple sets of formalities can decrease the risk of
false-negative outcomes because decedents who intend to execute
legally effective wills have an increased opportunity to complete the
189. Kelly, supra note 26, at 891.
190. See supra notes 174–179 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 175–179 and accompanying text.
193. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
194. See Lindgren, supra note 108, at 542.
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will-execution process successfully. For example, under the conven-
tional law, two witnesses must attest legally effective wills.195 This
requirement led to the invalidity of clearly authentic wills in situa-
tions in which decedents had wills notarized instead of attested.196
Because notarization, like attestation, is a highly formalized process
that decedents likely would not complete if they did not intend
their wills to be legally effective, courts had no reason to question
the authenticity of notarized wills.197 Yet, because they were unat-
tested, the conventional law required courts to deny probate and
consequently to produce obvious false-negative outcomes.198
In response, the UPC gives decedents the option to have their
wills either attested or notarized.199 The rationale underlying this
alternative method of will-execution is that notarization provides ev-
idence of a will’s authenticity equally as strong as attestation.200 As
such, this notarization alterative decreases the risk of false-negative
outcomes because clearly genuine wills are admitted to probate.
However, it produces only a slightly increased risk of false-positive
outcomes because, like the conventional attestation requirement,
the notarization alterative is highly formalized and the decedent
would not have completed the process without intending the will to
be legally effective.
Graph 15 depicts notarized wills as legally effective. The differen-
tiating line that is set at formality level f2 represents a scenario in
which valid wills must be attested by two witnesses. Purported wills
that lie slightly to the left of the differentiating line possess some
formality, such as being written, signed, and attested by one witness,
but they are nonetheless classified as inauthentic. The UPC’s au-
thorization of notarized wills recognizes that some of these wills
that lie slightly to the left of the differentiating line possess ex-
tremely robust evidence of authenticity.
195. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 147–48; see also supra Part I.A.
196. See, e.g., In re Will of Ferree, 848 A.2d 81 (N.J. Ch. 2003), aff’d 848 A.2d 1 (N.J. App.
2004) (invalidating a notarized will while purporting to apply the substantial compliance
doctrine); In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134 (Mont. 2002) (applying the harmless error rule
to save a notarized will).
197. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 182 (explaining that notarization “is per-
haps even better evidence of finality of intent to transfer than attestation by two witnesses”).
198. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“Under non-UPC
law, the will is usually held invalid in such cases, despite the lack of evidence raising any
doubt that the will truly represented the decedent’s wishes.”).
199. See id. § 2-502; see generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Authorizes Notarized Wills,
34 ACTEC J. 83 (2008). Only Colorado and North Dakota have followed the UPC’s lead and
authorized notarized wills. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502 (2015; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-
08-02(1) (2015).
200. See Waggoner, supra note 199, at 84.
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Purported wills that contain the signature of one witness might
possess less formal evidence of authenticity than wills that are at-
tested by two witnesses, but when the lone witness is a notary, the
distinction between two witnesses and one witness becomes fuzzy.201
Therefore, by authorizing notarized wills, the UPC classifies as au-
thentic some wills that are witnessed by a single person, but only
those that present little increased risk of false-positive outcomes.
Because this reform decreases the number of false-negative out-
comes, while not significantly increasing the risk of false-positive
outcomes, it reduces the overall level of probate-error risk. There-
fore, like its proposal to eliminate the technicalities of attestation,202
the UPC’s authorization of notarized wills represents a beneficial
reform proposal.
This type of reform is not the same as simply moving the differ-
entiating line toward the left-hand side of the x-axis, where
formality levels are lower.203 For example, authorization of nota-
rized wills does not push the differentiating line to point f1, where
wills are written, signed, and attested by a single witness, because
such a reform does not validate all purported wills that fall to the
right of that differentiating line. Indeed, as the UPC makes clear,
not all wills that are signed by one witness are classified as authen-
tic.204 Instead, by authorizing only notarized wills, the UPC
selectively classifies only some wills that fall between formality levels
201. See id. at 85 (“A testator who goes to the trouble of going to a bank or even a package
store or photocopy store to get a home-drawn will notarized shows as much of a deliberate
purpose to make the will final and valid as asking a couple of individuals to sign as
witnesses.”).
202. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also Part III.A.1.
203. See supra Part III.A.1.
204. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502.
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f2 and f1 as authentic. The UPC’s notarization option therefore illus-
trates that, if alternative formalities present evidence of authenticity
equally as reliable as conventional formalities, the broadening of
the available will-execution methods can diminish the total number
of probate errors.
Although the notarization and attestation alternatives entail
roughly equivalent levels of objective evidence of authenticity,
other alternatives could involve less evidence of authenticity than
the conventional attested will. For example, the UPC authorizes ho-
lographic wills, which must be written by hand and signed but need
not be witnessed.205 By eliminating the necessity of witnesses, ho-
lographic wills give decedents a less formal alternative to the
conventional attested will.206 This reduced formality diminishes the
risk of false-negative outcomes because some decedents intend cer-
tain handwritten documents to constitute legally effective wills but
nonetheless do not have the documents witnessed.207 Thus, if ho-
lographic wills are recognized as legally effective, some false-
negative outcomes are avoided because these wills are classified as
authentic. However, because holographs require significantly less
formality than conventional attested wills, they provide less cer-
tainty that they were intended to be legally effective; and therefore
they increase the risk of false-positive outcomes.208 Because holo-
graphs both decrease the risk of false-negative outcomes and
increase the risk of false-positive outcomes, their net effect on the
overall risk of probate errors is unclear.
Graphs 16 and 17 depict the authorization of holographic wills.
In both graphs, the differentiating line is set at a high level of for-
mality, which represents the conventional law’s requirement of a
written, signed, and attested will.209 The recognition of holographic
wills results in some wills that fall to the left of the differentiating
line being classified as authentic despite not satisfying the require-
ments of a conventional attested will. Whether recognition of
205. See id. § 2-502(b).
206. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 498 (“The legislative decision to authorize holographic
wills is, therefore, a fundamental one. It represents both an abandonment of the protective
policy, and an acceptance of a significantly lowered level of formality for implementing the
other Wills Act policies.”).
207. See Clowney, supra note 113, at 46 (“[H]olographs are an indispensable tool for testa-
tors who are either unwilling or unable to commission a traditional will.”).
208. See Brown, supra note 31, at 110–11 (“The testamentary intent requirement is usually
not an issue with formal, attested wills. . . . In contrast, holographic wills invite suspicion as to
the existence of testamentary intent. Holographic wills are often informal documents, such
as letters or memoranda, which lack any formal designation as a will or last testament. Even if
the holograph is denominated a will, the absence of the ceremonial execution that accompa-
nies attested wills, creates less certainty that the document was intended to be final.”).
209. See supra Part I.A.
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holographic wills reduces overall probate-error risk depends upon
the tradeoff between false-negative outcomes avoided and false-pos-
itive outcomes produced. However, unlike the authorization of
notarized wills, which clearly results in a net reduction of probate
errors,210 the net effect of holographic wills is less certain.211
Some scholars believe that holographic wills provide good evi-
dence of authenticity and therefore present little risk of false-
positive outcomes.212 Graph 16 represents a scenario in which rec-
ognition of holographic wills reduces the overall number of
probate errors. The areas between the two dashed vertical lines and
below the distribution curves represent holographic wills. Because
the area below the distribution curve for authentic wills is larger
than the area under the distribution curve for inauthentic wills, rec-
ognizing holographs as legally effective avoids more false-negative
outcomes than it produces false-positive outcomes.
By contrast, other scholars suggest that recognition of ho-
lographic wills presents a significant risk of false-positive outcomes
because holographic wills provide significantly less evidence of au-
thenticity than attested wills.213 Graph 17 represents this scenario,
as the two dashed vertical lines lie farther to the left-hand side of
the x-axis. The area under the distribution curve for inauthentic
wills is now greater than the area under the distribution curve for
authentic wills. Consequently, under this scenario, more false-posi-
tive outcomes are produced than false-negative outcomes are
avoided. Thus, similar to the decision of whether to abolish the at-
testation requirement,214 it is unclear whether policymakers should
210. See supra notes 195–201 and accompanying text.
211. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 201. Compare Brown, supra note 31 with
Clowney, supra note 113.
212. See, e.g., Clowney, supra note 113, at 60 (arguing that “neither forgery nor deceit
poses a significant threat to the integrity of do-it-yourself willmaking,” and that little evidence
suggest that “potential heirs attempt[ ] to probate handwritten notes not intended as final
testaments”).
213. Some argue that holographs are particularly susceptible to fraud and forgery. See,
e.g., Captain Theresa A. Bruno, The Deployment Will, 47 A.F. L. REV. 211, 214–15 (1999) (“[Ho-
lographic wills have carried with them the Statute of Frauds stigma of fraud and forgery.”);
Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 159, 169 (1998) (“Because of the absence of an attestation requirement, a
legitimate concern with holographic wills is that there be sufficient protection against forgery
or fraud.”). Others argue that a handwritten document provides little evidence that the dece-
dent intended it to be a legally effective will. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 31, at 113
(“Holographic wills, because of their informality, often leave . . . testamentary intent
uncertain.”).
214. See supra notes 174–179 and accompanying text. The recognition of holographic
wills could also affect a decedent’s incentive to leave behind an attested will and a wrong-
doer’s disincentive to attempt fraud. See supra notes 180–187 and accompanying text.
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authorize holographic wills because the net effect that such reform
would have on overall probate-error risk is uncertain.
























In sum, in addition to reducing the will-execution process’s over-
all level of formality,215 policymakers can adjust the allocation of
probate errors by broadening the scope of the prescribed formali-
ties. Some alternative will-execution methods, such as notarized
wills, likely reduce the chance of false-negative outcomes while
presenting little increased risk of false-positive outcomes.216 Other
alternatives, such as holographic wills, both reduce the risk of false-
negative outcomes and increase the risk of false-positive out-
comes.217 This analysis suggests that state policymakers should
follow the UPC’s lead and authorize notarized wills, but whether
215. See supra Part III.A.1.
216. See supra notes 195–201 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 205–214 and accompanying text.
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more states should authorize holographic wills is less clear. How-
ever, by identifying the role that the breadth of formality plays in
allocating probate errors, policymakers can make a more informed
decision regarding reform proposals aimed at refining the formali-
ties of will-execution. In turn, policymakers may become more
amenable to straying from the conventional law and the reform
movement may be more likely to achieve its goal of reallocating the
risk of probate errors.
B. Judicial Correction of Errors
Like the refined formality reform strategy, the relaxed compli-
ance reform strategy is aimed at minimizing probate-error risk.
However, it pursues this goal very differently. Whereas the refined
formality strategy changes the way that risk is initially allocated by
the formal will-execution process,218 the relaxed compliance reform
strategy reduces probate-error risk by granting courts the discretion
to correct some probate errors that will-execution formalities pro-
duce. The conventional rule of strict compliance denies courts the
discretion to evaluate the authenticity of noncompliant wills based
upon extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent.219 Consequently,
courts traditionally cannot correct the obvious false-negative out-
comes that are produced by the highly formal will-execution
process.220 By contrast, relaxed compliance rules allow probate
courts to validate formally defective wills if the courts are convinced
that the wills are authentic.221
The prototypical relaxed compliance rule is the UPC’s harmless
error rule.222 Under the UPC, if a decedent fails to comply with the
prescribed will-execution formalities, the probate court need not
automatically invalidate the will.223 Instead, the UPC allows the
court to excuse harmless formal defects when evidence suggests
218. See supra Part III.A.
219. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 489; see also supra Part I.B.
220. As previously discussed, the conventional law’s denial of discretion to correct false-
negative outcomes is inconsistent with its grant of discretion to correct false-positive out-
comes. See supra Part II.B.
221. See Glover, supra note 2, at 100–02; Lester, supra note 26, at 579–82.
222. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see generally
Langbein, supra note 79. A related relaxed compliance rule is the substantial compliance
doctrine, which “rework[s] the strict compliance rule’s conclusive presumption of invalidity
for an imperfect execution into a rebuttable one that could be overcome with strong evi-
dence of intent and satisfaction of the purposes of the Wills Act.” DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,
supra note 1, at 179; see generally Langbein, supra 3.
223. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503.
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that a decedent intended a noncompliant document to constitute a
legally effective will.224 Thus, relaxed compliance reform proposals,
such as the UPC’s harmless error rule, authorize courts to correct
false-negative outcomes by reclassifying noncompliant wills as
authentic.
Although courts could use the harmless error rule to avoid some
probate errors, probate courts will not always correctly judge the
authenticity of a noncompliant will.225 On the one hand, courts
could correctly excuse harmless formal defects and avoid some ob-
vious false-negative outcomes.226 On the other hand, courts could
validate some noncompliant wills that were not intended to be le-
gally effective.227 Granting courts discretion to excuse formal
defects could therefore produce some false-positive outcomes that
would have been avoided under the conventional law. Nevertheless,
as long as the number of false-negative outcomes that are avoided is
greater than the number of false-positive outcomes that are created,
reform of this type will result in fewer total probate errors.
In the past, concern regarding whether probate courts could ac-
curately evaluate the authenticity of wills may have explained the
conventional law’s rule of strict compliance.228 Probate courts tradi-
tionally possessed limited jurisdiction and were frequently presided
over by judges with no formal legal training.229 Because of this infer-
ior status, the duties and responsibilities of probate courts typically
were limited.230 As Professor Bruce Mann explains, “The responsi-
bilities of the probate judge tended to be ministerial,” and “[t]he
224. See id. (“Although a document . . . was not executed in compliance with [the pre-
scribed formalities], the document . . . is treated as if it had been executed in compliance . . .
if the proponent of the document . . . establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent intended the document . . . to constitute . . . the decedent’s will . . . .”).
225. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 467 (“If factfinding were . . . unreliable . . . , the
dispensation rule would be a very dangerous proposition.”).
226. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 889 (“The harmless error rule may decrease one type of
error costs—specifically, false negatives or ‘Type II’ errors—as a court is authorized to excuse
an execution defect . . . .”).
227. See id. (“[T]he harmless error rule entails the possibility of errors costs; courts, oper-
ating with imperfect information, may not apply harmless error correctly or uniformly in
every case.”).
228. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 503 (“It is open to argument that the rule of literal
compliance with the Wills Act formalities is the doctrinal consequence of the inferior status
of the probate courts. Such courts cannot be trusted with anything more complicated than a
wholly mechanical rule.”); see also Glover, supra note 113, at 41–43.
229. See Mann, supra note 151, at 62; Lewis M. Simes & Paul E. Basye, The Organization of
the Probate Court in America: II, 43 MICH. L. REV. 113, 139 (1944) (reporting that in the first
half of the twentieth century half the states allowed non-lawyer probate judges); see also
Langbein, supra note 3, at 502–03 (describing the “downgrading of probate courts”).
230. See Mann, supra note 151, at 62.
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functions of probate courts in wills matters were essentially adminis-
trative—to determine whether or not to accept the will for probate,
issue the necessary letters, approve the final accounting, and similar
tasks.”231 Within this context, the rule of strict compliance prohib-
ited probate courts from making individualized determinations of a
will’s authenticity based upon evidence other than formal compli-
ance. As Mann continues, “The requirement of strict compliance
with the wills act formalities limits discretionary interpretation of
the formalities by discouraging anything other than mechanical, lit-
eral application of them,” and, as such, it “provid[es] a measure of
control over probate courts of limited jurisdiction.”232
Although concerns that probate courts could not evaluate the
authenticity of wills accurately may previously have been legitimate,
today these concerns seem questionable.233 Now non-lawyer judges
rarely staff probate courts,234 and courts with more expansive juris-
diction frequently handle probate matters.235 Langbein dismisses
the previous concerns regarding the ability of probate courts by ex-
plaining that “the litigation which would occur [if courts could
excuse formal defects] raises familiar issues which the courts have
demonstrated their ability to handle well.”236 Although probate
courts are now likely better equipped to accurately evaluate the au-
thenticity of wills, some policymakers may still want to limit courts’
discretion to correct probate errors. By restricting courts’ ability to
reclassify noncompliant wills as authentic, policymakers can reduce
the risk that the court will inadvertently create false-positive out-
comes. In this regard, policymakers can limit courts’ discretion by
231. Id.
232. Id.; see Langbein, supra note 3, at 503.
233. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 882 (“Overall, the harmless error rule . . . appear[s] to
reduce the probability of Type II errors without substantially increasing the likelihood of
Type I errors.”); Sherwin, supra note 81, at 467 (“[A] high rate of error is improbable. To
date, no evidence suggests a systematic judicial bias in favor of unintended dispositions.”).
234. See James Findley, Note, The Debate Over Nonlawyer Probate Judges: A Historical Perspec-
tive, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (2010) (“Today, only Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, and
New Jersey allow nonlawyers to become judges handling matters of probate, and in some
states, existing nonlawyer probate judges continue to serve under grandfather clauses.”).
235. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 503 n.62 (explaining that “the recent trend is to up-
grade the probate courts to the status of courts of general jurisdiction”); Mann, supra note
151, at 62–63 (“The small but growing number of jurisdictions that have adopted the Uni-
form Probate Code have consolidated the probate court as a division of the trial court of
general jurisdiction with full adjudicative power. Other states have given the probate court
the powers of a court of general jurisdiction over probate matters.”).
236. Langbein, supra note 3, at 525 (adding that similar issues “arise in other contexts in
current litigation when courts examine whether purported wills evidence testamentary intent
and were executed freely and with finality”); see Sherwin, supra note 81, at 464 (“A judicial
power to dispense with formality requirements, in comparison with the traditional rule of
strict enforcement, increases decisional accuracy.”).
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specifying the type of formal defects that courts can excuse as harm-
less.237 They can also require courts to possess a particular degree of
certainty regarding a will’s authenticity before it can reclassify a
noncompliant will as authentic.238
1. Scope of Discretion
If policymakers decide that noncompliance should not necessi-
tate the invalidity of a will, they must delineate the scope of the
court’s discretion to reclassify noncompliant wills as authentic. In
other words, they must decide which formal defects a court can ex-
cuse as harmless. In this regard, policymakers in the few states that
have relaxed the requirement of strict compliance have chosen ei-
ther to extend the court’s discretion to all formal defects or to limit
the court’s discretion to specific formal defects.
Under the UPC’s harmless error rule, courts have broad discre-
tion. Drastic departures from the prescribed formalities would
render testamentary intent difficult to establish, but courts could
theoretically use the harmless error rule to excuse any formal de-
fect.239  Furthermore, under the UPC, courts can consider all
evidence of testamentary intent, and no particular evidence is nec-
essary.240 The Restatement (Third) of Property explains that a court
should consider any “evidence regarding the overall conduct of the
testator.”241 The conventional law and the UPC therefore favor two
radically different approaches to defining the scope of the court’s
discretion to reclassify formally defective wills as authentic. The
conventional law denies courts discretion to evaluate evidence of
authenticity by mandating that they consider only the testator’s
compliance with the prescribed formalities. By contrast, the UPC
suggests that courts should have broad discretion to correct any for-
mal defect and that they should not be limited to a particular type
of evidence of authenticity.
237. See infra Part III.B.1.
238. See infra Part III.B.2.
239. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“The larger the
departure from [the prescribed] formality, the harder it will be to satisfy the Court that the
instrument reflects the testator’s intent.”); In re Estate of Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, 17 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
2012). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The requirement of a writing is so fundamental to the
purpose of the execution formalities that it cannot be excused as harmless . . . .”).
240. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503.
241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3
cmt. b.
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Graph 18 represents the scope of the court’s discretion to reclas-
sify noncompliant wills as authentic under the UPC’s harmless
error rule. The differentiating line is set at the conventional law’s
high level of formality, and all wills that fall to the left of the differ-
entiating line are initially presumed to be inauthentic. Under the
conventional law’s rule of strict compliance, courts have no discre-
tion to change an initial inauthentic classification. However, under
the UPC’s harmless error rule, courts have broad discretion to
reevaluate all initial inauthentic classifications and to reclassify
noncompliant wills if extrinsic evidence establishes authenticity.
The shaded area that encompasses all wills that fall to the left of the
differentiating line represents this broad discretion.










Despite the divergent viewpoints that the conventional law and
the UPC take concerning the scope of the court’s discretion, policy-
makers are not limited to these two extremes. Instead of granting
courts the discretion to excuse all formal defects, policymakers
could restrict the scope of the court’s discretion by specifying a lim-
ited set of formal compliance errors that courts can overlook. By
striking a compromise between the conventional law and the UPC
regarding the scope of the court’s discretion, a formal compliance
rule that specifies a limited set of formal defects that the court can
excuse also strikes a compromise regarding probate-error risk.
Harmless error rules that limit the scope of the court’s discretion
allow courts to correct some of the more apparent false-negative
outcomes but attempt to limit the risk that the court’s discretion
will increase the rate of false-positive outcomes.
Following this approach to reform, California, Colorado, and Vir-
ginia each enacted formal compliance rules that limit the court’s
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discretion to reclassify formally defective wills as authentic to partic-
ular types of will-execution defects.242 As such, they attempt to
minimize probate-error risk by allowing courts to correct obvious
false-negative outcomes and by denying courts the ability to evalu-
ate a noncompliant will’s authenticity in less obvious cases. For
instance, California enacted a will-execution statute that requires
strict compliance with the writing and signature requirements.243
However, it grants probate courts the discretion to excuse will-exe-
cution errors related to the attestation requirement.244 Under this
rule, courts have no discretion to reclassify an oral declaration or
an unsigned document as authentic, but a document that fails to
satisfy the attestation formality is not necessarily invalid. Instead,
noncompliance with the attestation requirement raises a rebuttable
presumption of inauthenticity. If the will’s proponent can prove
that the testator intended the document to be his will, the court will
validate the will despite the attestation defect.245
California’s harmless error rule represents a compromise be-
tween the conventional law’s denial of discretion and the UPC’s
grant of broad discretion. On the one hand, by maintaining the
strict compliance requirement with respect to the writing and signa-
ture formalities, California’s rule removes from the court’s
discretion those formal defects that are least likely to produce false-
negative outcomes. The writing and signatures formalities are
strong evidence of testamentary intent, and without this evidence,
242. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110 (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503 (2015); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2015). Ohio has also enacted a harmless error rule that limits the
scope of courts’ discretion. See infra note 244. Six other states have enacted the UPC’s harm-
less error rule thereby granting courts discretion to excuse all harmless formal defects. See
Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 184.
243. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110; see generally Peter T. Wendel, California Probate Code Sec-
tion 6110(C)(2): How Big is the Hole in the Dike?, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 387 (2012).
244. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (“If a will was not executed in compliance with
[the prescribed formalities], the will shall be treated as if it was executed in compliance . . . if
the proponent of the will establishes by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time the
testator signed the will, the testator intended the will to constitute the testator’s will.”). Ohio
has also enacted a will-execution statute that limits courts’ discretion to attestation errors.
Under the statute, the court can excuse an attestation error if it finds that “[t]he decedent
signed the document . . . in the conscious presence of two or more witnesses.” OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2107.24. Thus, Ohio courts can excuse witnesses’ failure to sign the will, but to
decide the issue of testamentary intent, the court must look for the specific evidence that the
decedent signed the will in the presence of witnesses. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pittson, No. 2008
CA 00014, 2009 WL 1065384 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2009) (affirming the lower court’s
decision to deny a formally defective document admission to probate); In re Jordan, No.
08CA773, 2008 WL 3990836 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2008) (affirming the lower court’s deci-
sion to admit a formally defective document to probate).
245. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2).
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the court would seldom conclude that a noncompliant will is au-
thentic.246 Because the strict compliance requirement reaches the
correct result in most instances of oral and unsigned wills, Califor-
nia’s harmless error rule denies courts discretion to overlook
writing and signature defects.
On the other hand, by providing courts discretion with respect to
attestation defects, California’s harmless error rule prevents auto-
matic invalidation in situations in which formally defective wills
more likely reflect genuine testamentary intent.247 The Restatement
(Third) of Property explains, “Because attestation makes a more
modest contribution to the purpose of the formalities, defects in
compliance with attestation procedures are more easily excused.”248
Put differently, a testator’s failure to strictly comply with the attesta-
tion formality raises fewer doubts regarding a will’s authenticity
than a testator’s failure to leave behind a signed writing. The appli-
cation of the strict compliance requirement in cases involving
attestation errors consequently produces more false-negative out-
comes than the rule’s application in cases involving writing and
signature defects. Therefore, by providing courts discretion to vali-
date wills despite attestation errors, California’s harmless error rule
allows courts to correct easily recognizable false-negative outcomes.
However, by denying courts the discretion to excuse writing and
signature formalities, it minimizes the risk that courts’ discretion
will increase false-positive outcomes.
Graph 19 depicts California’s reform strategy with the shaded
area representing the scope of the court’s discretion. In contrast to
the UPC’s harmless error rule, which extends the court’s discretion
to all formally defective wills,249 California’s rule allows courts to
evaluate the authenticity of wills that fall just to the left of the differ-
entiating line, but denies discretion for wills that fall farther toward
the left-hand side of the x-axis. Because the shaded area under the
distribution curve for authentic wills is greater than the shaded area
246. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3
cmt. b (“The requirement of a writing is so fundamental to the purpose of the execution
formalities that it cannot be excused as harmless . . . . Among the defects in execution that
can be excused, the lack of a signature is the hardest to excuse. An unsigned will raises a
serious but not insuperable doubt about whether the testator adopted the document as his or
her will.”); John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in Wills: The Restate-
ment of Wills Delivers New Tools (and New Duties) to Probate Lawyers, 18 PROB. & PROP. 28, 30–31
(2004).
247. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (describing attesta-
tion defects as a “recurrent class of case[s]” that will be excused as harmless).
248. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3
cmt. b.
249. See supra notes 239–241 and accompanying text.
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under the distribution curve for inauthentic wills, most wills within
the scope of the court’s discretion are authentic.250 Thus, by al-
lowing courts to excuse attestation defects, California’s harmless
error rule grants courts discretion to evaluate authenticity in cases
that pose the greatest risk of false-negative outcomes. By contrast,
wills that fall to the left of the shaded area have signature or writing
defects, consequently possessing less objective evidence of authen-
ticity.251 Because these wills are more likely inauthentic,252
California denies courts discretion to reclassify them as authentic
out of concern that courts might incorrectly evaluate authenticity in
these more difficult cases.










Like California’s harmless error rule, Colorado’s will-execution
statute gives courts discretion to excuse all attestation defects.253 But
whereas California denies courts the discretion to overlook other
types of will-execution defects, Colorado allows courts to excuse
some signature errors.254 Indeed, the statute limits the court’s abil-
ity to excuse signature defects by requiring the court to find specific
evidence of authenticity before excusing such errors. Colorado
courts can only correct a probate error produced by a decedent’s
250. Some may suggest that allowing courts to excuse the complete absence of attestation
could extend the scope of discretion to wills that are more likely inauthentic. See supra notes
174–179 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
252. The increased likelihood of inauthenticity is represented by the larger area under
the distribution curve for inauthentic wills and left of the shaded area.
253. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503(1) (2015).
254. See id. § 15-11-503(2).
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failure to comply with the signature requirement when spouses mis-
takenly sign each other’s wills.255 This situation occurs when a
husband and wife intend to execute similar wills at the same execu-
tion ceremony, but the couple’s lawyer erroneously instructs the
spouses to sign the wrong documents.256 Other than the limited sit-
uations in which this evidence of authenticity is present, Colorado
courts cannot excuse signature errors.257
Although the lack of a signature may represent strong evidence
of inauthenticity,258 the switched-wills context is different than most
other circumstances in which the decedent fails to sign the will. Un-
like situations in which the decedent merely leaves behind an
unsigned document, when spouses sign each other’s wills, they
leave behind robust evidence that they intended the wills to be le-
gally effective.259 The wills of spouses frequently contain similar
terms and are typically executed at the same time.260 These circum-
stances strongly suggest that spouses who sign each other’s wills do
so mistakenly. The application of the strict compliance require-
ment in this context therefore requires the court to invalidate the
wills despite strong evidence of testamentary intent. To avoid these
obvious false-negative outcomes, Colorado’s harmless error rule al-
lows the court to reclassify switched wills as authentic. However, the
rule denies courts the discretion to excuse other signature errors,
which provide less evidence of authenticity and consequently pose a
255. Id. (allowing courts to excuse harmless errors “only if the document is signed or
acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document to be the will of the decedent’s
spouse”). Virginia allows courts to excuse signature defects in similar situations. See infra note
270.
256. See Langbein, supra note 79, at 24; see, e.g., In re Estate of Pavlinko, 148 A.2d 528 (Pa.
1959).
257. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503(2).
258. See Langbein, supra note 246, at 31 (“One of the things that you are free to do with a
will that has been drafted for you is to decide not to execute it. Failure to sign the will is
seldom harmless, because it raises a grave doubt about whether the testator intended the
instrument to be his or her will.”).
259. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“The main circum-
stances in which the South Australian courts have excused signature errors has been in the
recurrent class of cases in which two wills are prepared for simultaneous by two testators,
typically husband and wife, and each mistakenly signs the will prepared for the other.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 2003); (“A particularly attractive case for excusing the lack of the testator’s signa-
ture is a crossed will case, in which, by mistake, a wife signs her husband’s will and the
husband signs his wife’s will.”); Langbein, supra note 79, at 6 (“Nobody favors abolishing the
requirement that the testator sign his will, yet many would agree that noncompliance with
the signature should be excused under extraordinary circumstances, as in the switched-wills
cases . . . .”).
260. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pavlinko, 148 A.2d 528.
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higher risk that courts will incorrectly reclassify the noncompliant
will as authentic.
Graph 20 illustrates Colorado’s reform strategy with the shaded
area representing the limited scope of Colorado’s harmless error
rule. Like California, Colorado authorizes courts to excuse attesta-
tion errors,261 which lie immediately to the left of the differentiating
line. But whereas the scope of California’s harmless error rule ends
at attestation errors,262 Colorado’s rule extends the courts’ discre-
tion to other will-execution defects that lie farther to the left of the
x-axis. Because a signature defect raises serious doubts regarding a
will’s authenticity,263 if the court’s discretion extended to all signa-
ture defects, the shaded area representing the scope of courts’
discretion would include a greater number of inauthentic wills than
authentic wills. This raises concerns that courts might incorrectly
reclassify wills with signature defects and that this discretion could
therefore increase the risk of false-positive outcomes more than it
would decrease the risk of false-negative outcomes.
However, instead of extending the courts’ discretion to all signa-
ture errors, Colorado’s rule carves out a subset of signature errors
that courts can excuse.264 Because the switched-will context pro-
vides strong evidence of authenticity,265 by limiting courts’
discretion to this subset of cases, Colorado’s harmless error rule
weeds out the cases in which the will’s authenticity is most in ques-
tion while allowing courts to excuse signature errors in the cases
that more likely produce false-negative outcomes. The shaded area
that represents the scope of courts’ discretion therefore does not
extend all the way to the distribution curve for inauthentic wills.
Rather, it is confined to a region in which the likelihood of false-
negative outcomes is roughly equivalent to the likelihood of false-
positive outcomes.266 By limiting the courts’ discretion to this subset
of signature defects, Colorado’s harmless error rule allows courts to
correct obvious false-negative outcomes without significantly in-
creasing the likelihood of false-positive outcomes.
261. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503.
262. See supra notes 243–252 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
264. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503(2).
265. See supra notes 259–260 and accompanying text.
266. While Graph 20 depicts a scenario in which the likelihood of authenticity and of
inauthenticity for switched-wills is equal, it could be argued that that the likelihood of au-
thenticity is much greater than the likelihood of inauthenticity.
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Like Colorado, Virginia authorizes the courts to excuse all attes-
tation errors when extrinsic evidence establishes the will’s
authenticity, but significantly limits courts’ discretion to excuse sig-
nature errors.267 Virginia authorizes courts to excuse signature
errors in two specific situations.268 First, a court can overlook the
testator’s failure to sign a will when two testators mistakenly sign
each other’s wills.269 Second, a court can excuse signature errors
when the testator mistakenly signs a self-proving affidavit rather
than the will itself.270 Thus, with the addition of the ability to over-
look the mistaken signing of a self-proving affidavit, the courts’
authority to excuse signature errors is broader under the Virginia
statute than under the Colorado statute.
Like the switched-wills context, the situation in which the testator
mistakenly signs a self-proving affidavit instead of the will itself pro-
vides strong evidence of testamentary intent. In such situations, the
testator’s signature upon an affidavit asserting that she previously
signed the will strongly suggests the failure to sign the will was sim-
ply a mistake and that she intended the will to be legally effective.271
267. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2015).
268. See id. § 64.2-404(B).
269. See id.
270. See id. The Virginia statute, however, is also broader in that it applies to all situations
in which two testators mistakenly sign each other’s will. Unlike the Colorado statute, it is not
limited to situations in which married couples sign the wrong wills. Compare COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-11-503(2) (2015) (authorizing the court to excuse errors where a “decedent erroneously
signed a document to be the will of the decedent’s spouse”), with VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404(B)
(authorizing the court to excuse errors “where two persons mistakenly sign each other’s will”)
(emphasis added). The limitation in Colorado’s statute that allows excusal of signature errors
only in switched-wills cases involving married spouses is problematic. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-11-503(2).
271. See Mann, supra note 50, at 1045 (“Sometimes . . . execution goes awry, and the
testator or witnesses sign only the self-proving affidavit rather than the will or attestation
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Thus, just as the application of the strict compliance requirement
in the switched-wills context produces clear instances of false-nega-
tive outcomes, the application of the conventional law in the self-
proving affidavit context also invalidates clearly authentic wills. Vir-
ginia’s compliance rule authorizes excusal of signature errors in
such cases,272 and it therefore allows courts to avoid obvious false-
negative outcomes while creating little increased risk of false-posi-
tive outcomes.273
Graph 21 depicts Virginia’s reform strategy. The shaded area
that represents the scope of the court’s discretion encompasses all
attestation errors, which lie immediately to the left of the differenti-
ating line, and two subsets of signature errors, namely the switched-
wills cases and the self-proving affidavit cases, which lie farther to
the left of the differentiating line.274 By limiting the court’s discre-
tion to excuse signature errors to these two subsets of cases,
Virginia allows the court to avoid some of the more obvious false-
negative outcomes but limits the possibility that the court will incor-
rectly reclassify noncompliant wills as authentic in some of the
more difficult signature error cases.
clause. Given that self-proving affidavits closely resemble attestation clauses and are typically
executed with the will and attached to it, there is scant reason not to accept the signatures to
them as sufficient attestation.”).
272. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404(B).
273. See J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 435, 438 (2008)
(“It is believed that [Virginia’s] forward-looking legislation will . . . result in an increased
honoring of Virginians’ testamentary intent because wills that are substantively valid will now
be probatable notwithstanding technical defects in their execution.”).
274. While Graph 21 depicts a scenario in which the likelihood of authenticity and of
inauthenticity for self-proving affidavit cases is equal, it could be argued that that the likeli-
hood of authenticity is much greater than the likelihood of inauthenticity. Indeed, signature
of the self-proving affidavit provides such strong evidence of testamentary intent that the
UPC suggests that authenticity should be presumed in such cases. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-504(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“A signature affixed to a self-proving affidavit attached
to a will is considered a signature affixed to the will . . . .”).
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In sum, when crafting a formal compliance rule, policymakers
must delineate the scope of courts’ discretion. As a compromise
between the conventional law’s strict compliance requirement and
the UPC’s harmless error rule, policymakers can decide to allow
courts to excuse only certain formal defects. This approach gives
courts greater discretion to evaluate a noncompliant will’s authen-
ticity than the conventional law but less than the UPC’s harmless
error rule. As exemplified by the statutes adopted by California,
Colorado, and Virginia,275 such an approach allows courts to excuse
formal defects in situations in which the application of the strict
compliance requirement would produce obvious false-negative out-
comes. However, because courts’ discretion is limited to specific
circumstances that provide strong evidence of authenticity, allowing
courts to excuse noncompliance results in little increased risk of
false-positive outcomes.
Because this more moderate reform strategy provides courts less
discretion to excuse formal defects than does the UPC’s harmless
error rule, some proponents of reform might look upon it with dis-
favor.276 Indeed, if there is little concern that courts will incorrectly
reclassify noncompliant wills as authentic,277 the UPC’s harmless er-
ror rule and its broader grant of discretion would result in a greater
reduction in probate-errors. Nevertheless, by providing courts at
least some discretion to evaluate a noncompliant will’s authenticity,
275. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110 (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503; VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-404.
276. See Samuel Flaks, Excusing Harmless Error in Will Execution: The Israeli Experience, 3 EST.
PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 27, 34 (2010) (suggesting that statutes like those found in
California, Colorado and Virginia, which “merge[ ] . . . the dispensing power and strict com-
pliance[,] may disappoint purist advocates of the [UPC’s] Harmless Error Rule”).
277. See supra notes 225–236 and accompanying text.
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the relaxed compliance rules that were adopted by California, Colo-
rado, and Virginia decrease the likelihood that courts will invalidate
genuine wills because of harmless formal defects. As such, a formal
compliance rule that limits courts’ discretion by specifying the for-
mal defects that can be excused furthers the reform movement’s
goal of reducing the risk of false-negative outcomes while not also
significantly increasing the risk of false-positive outcomes. Despite
some potential disappointment, most advocates of reform would
therefore seem to prefer California, Colorado, or Virginia’s harm-
less error rule to the conventional rule of strict compliance.
Ultimately, these variations of reform suggest that, if given a clear
picture of the possible types of formal compliance rules, other
states may be willing to implement change and move away from the
conventional rule of strict compliance.278
2. Degree of Certainty
When probate courts are given discretion to validate formally de-
fective wills, policymakers not only must delineate the scope of
courts’ discretion but also must decide how convincingly the propo-
nent must establish the will’s authenticity. More specifically, state
policymakers must select the standard of proof that a proponent
must satisfy before a court will excuse a formal defect. Policymakers
have three primary options from which to choose. These include
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard that is traditionally used in
criminal trials,279 the preponderance of the evidence standard that
is typically used in civil litigation,280 and the clear and convincing
evidence standard, which is incorporated into the UPC’s harmless
error rule.281 These different standards require the proponent of a
formally deficient will to establish a will’s authenticity to varying de-
grees of certainty and therefore provide courts varying degrees of
discretion to correct probate errors by excusing formal defects.
The first option that state policymakers could select is the reason-
able doubt standard. This standard requires the court to be
convinced to a near certainty that the decedent intended to exe-
cute a legally effective will in order to validate a noncompliant
278. Only ten states have enacted a reform that grants courts discretion to excuse formal
defects. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 184.
279. See Langbein, supra note 79, at 461.
280. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 461.
281. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); Langbein, supra note 79,
at 53.
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document.282 Langbein explains that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard “originates in the criminal law, where it serves the special
purpose of tilting the scales in favor of liberty for an accused who is
threatened with penal sanctions.”283 By requiring the prosecution to
establish a very high likelihood of guilt and therefore tipping the
scales in favor of liberty, the reasonable doubt standard minimizes
the likelihood of a wrongful conviction.284 In other words, because
the prosecution has the burden of establishing guilt, the reasonable
doubt standard diminishes the likelihood of false-positive outcomes
in the criminal law context, while producing a higher incidence of
false-negative outcomes.
The reasonable doubt standard would operate similarly in the
law of wills. Like the scales of justice in the criminal law context are
tilted in favor of liberty, the determination of authenticity in the
will-execution context would be skewed in favor of invalidity. The
proponent of a formally defective will would have to establish to a
near certainty that the decedent intended the will to be legally ef-
fective, and if she could not satisfy this high evidentiary burden, the
will would be invalid. Therefore, if the reasonable doubt standard
were integrated into a relaxed formal compliance rule, the court
would be able to correct only the most obvious false-negative
outcomes.
Because the courts discretion to reclassify formally defective wills
as authentic is so limited, a relaxed compliance rule that requires
the proponent to establish authenticity beyond a reasonable doubt
does not significantly reduce overall probate-error risk. Indeed, the
reasonable doubt standard requires such strong evidence of au-
thenticity and tilts the scales in favor of invalidity so much that it
would essentially render reform ineffective. Langbein explains that
“adherence to the [reasonable doubt] standard would . . . re-
quire[ ] the courts to frustrate well-proven testator’s intent under a
remedial statute that was designed to achieve the opposite.”285
282. See Langbein, supra note 79, at 34.
283. Id. Criminal law tips the scales in favor of liberty because a wrongful conviction is
considered more costly than a wrongful acquittal. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying
text.
284. See Bierschback & Stein, supra note 87, at 191; see also supra note 87 and accompany-
ing text.
285. See Langbein, supra note 79, at 34. Langbein’s analysis was informed by the experi-
ence of the Australian state of South Australia, which enacted a harmless error statute
requiring the will’s proponent to establish testamentary intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
See id. at 34–35. Langbein explains that the South Australian courts did not allow the reasona-
ble doubt standard to undermine the purpose of the harmless error rule, and that “[i]nstead,
they . . . weakened the [reasonable doubt] standard while purporting to apply it.” Id. at 35.
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Thus, a harmless error rule that includes a reasonable doubt stan-
dard is substantially equivalent to the rule of strict compliance.
Whereas under the conventional rule of strict compliance courts
have no discretion to reclassify formally defective wills as authentic,
a relaxed compliance rule that includes a reasonable doubt stan-
dard of proof allows courts to correct only unmistakable false-
negative outcomes.
The second standard of proof that state policymakers could se-
lect is the preponderance of the evidence standard.286 A proponent
of a will satisfies this standard if the court is convinced simply that
the decedent more likely than not intended to execute a legally
effective will.287 In percentage terms, the proponent of the will
meets this standard if she convinces the court that the likelihood
that the will is authentic is greater than fifty percent.288 By requiring
this minimal level of certainty regarding the decedent’s intent, the
preponderance standard provides the court substantial discretion
to reclassify formally defective wills as authentic. Whereas the rea-
sonable doubt standard limits the court’s discretion to only the
most obvious false-negative outcomes,289 the preponderance stan-
dard allows courts to evaluate the authenticity of wills in more
difficult cases. By granting courts broad discretion, this standard
reaches the correct outcome as frequently as possible.290 Therefore,
because the goal of the law of will-execution is to minimize probate-
error risk, the preponderance standard would seem to be the ap-
propriate standard of proof for a relaxed compliance rule.291
286. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 461.
287. See id.
288. See Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-
Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983) (“This traditionally requires demon-
strating that the existence of the contested fact is more probably than its nonexistence.”); see
also Sherwin, supra note 81, at 461 (“The preponderance standard is a concession to the fact
that whether or not truth is discoverable in theory, it cannot be discovered with absolute
certainty in the limited circumstances of a trial. Because courts must reach their decisions
under conditions of uncertainty, their goal should be to come as close as possible to the
truth, or in other words, to reach the outcome that is most probably correct.”).
289. See supra notes 282–285 and accompanying text.
290. See Mitchell N. Berman, Replay, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1683, 1694 (2011) (“Error minimiza-
tion . . . is precisely the rationale behind the law’s preponderance of the evidence . . .
standard of proof.”); Orloff & Stedinger, supra notes 288, at 1172 (“If the goal is to minimize
the number of erroneously decided cases . . . the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule
emerges as the superior choice.”); Sherwin, supra note 81, at 462–63 (“A preponderance
standard produces the greatest number of correct decisions, within the limits of the court’s
factfinding abilities.”).
291. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 467 (arguing that “the objective . . . should be to
determine as accurately as possible whether or not the decedent had testamentary intent”
and that “[f]or this purpose, the preponderance standard can be expected to produce the
best set of outcomes”). But see infra notes 298–315 and accompanying text.
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Other reasons also suggest that the preponderance standard
might be the appropriate standard of proof. First, a higher standard
of proof would be appropriate if false-positive outcomes were more
costly than false-negative outcomes.292 For instance, the reasonable
doubt standard is applied in criminal trials in order to avoid convic-
tions of innocent defendants, which are considered more costly
than acquittals of guilty defendants.293 But, as previously explained,
within the law of wills false-positive outcomes and false-negative out-
comes produce equal error costs, as both undermine the
decedent’s intent.294 Thus, the preponderance standard seems ap-
propriate because it values false-negative outcomes and false-
positive outcomes equally. Second, a higher standard of proof
could be justified if there were concerns regarding the court’s abil-
ity to accurately evaluate the authenticity of wills.295 A higher
standard would limit the court’s discretion to easier cases in which
the court would more likely make accurate determinations of au-
thenticity.296  But as discussed above, concerns regarding the
competency of probate courts are largely unfounded,297 and there-
fore, broader discretion would likely lead to reduced rates of
probate errors.
The final standard of proof that state policymakers could select is
the clear and convincing evidence standard.298 This option falls
somewhere between the preponderance and reasonable doubt stan-
dards.299 Although the clear and convincing standard is difficult to
state in percentage terms,300 it requires more certainty than the
fifty-one percent that is required by the preponderance standard,
but less than the near one hundred percent certainty that is re-
quired by the reasonable doubt standard. Langbein selected this
standard for the reform movement’s harmless error rule because it
292. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 463 (suggesting that a higher standard of proof “might
be appropriate if an erroneous decision upholding an informal will is substantially more
costly than an erroneous decision rejecting an informal will”).
293. See supra notes 85–87, 282–284 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
295. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 467 (“If there were reason to think that courts will
make frequent mistakes in applying the dispensation rule, a high standard of proof might be
warranted.”).
296. See id. (“[I]f the number of unintended wills that court would admit under a prepon-
derance standard exceeds the number of intended wills that would be rejected under a rule
of strict enforcement of will formalities, [a higher standard of proof] might serve to counter-
act judicial error.”).
297. See supra notes 233–236 and accompanying text.
298. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
299. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 462.
300. See id.; Vars, supra note 26, at 8.
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strikes a compromise between the broad discretion to validate for-
mally defective wills that courts enjoy under the preponderance
standard and the severely restricted discretion that courts have
under the reasonable doubt standard.301
Langbein favored the compromise of the clear and convincing
standard because he had concerns about the preponderance stan-
dard.302 As previously discussed, the preponderance standard would
seem to be appropriate because it grants courts the broadest discre-
tion to correct false-negative outcomes by reclassifying formally
defective wills as authentic.303 However, just as there are good rea-
sons to tilt the scales in favor of the defendant in the criminal law
context,304 Langbein believed that compelling policy objectives
weighed in favor of tilting the scales in the will-execution context
slightly in favor of false-negative outcomes. Langbein explains,
“Even granting, as some allege, that the [clear and convincing]
standard is hard to define and to enforce, its hortatory effect, cau-
tioning the trier that the issue is one of special seriousness, is worth
preserving.”305 Similarly, the official comment to the UPC explains
that,
By placing the burden of proof upon the proponent of a de-
fective instrument, and by requiring the proponent to
discharge that burden by clear and convincing evidence
(which courts at the trial and appellate levels are urged to po-
lice with rigor), [the harmless error rule] imposes procedural
standards appropriate to the seriousness of the issue.306
This cautioning as to the seriousness of the issue could be di-
rected toward courts that must evaluate the authenticity of formally
defective wills. Under this reading of Langbein’s concerns, the
higher standard of proof could encourage courts to use their best
efforts to correctly decide the issue of a will’s authenticity, thereby
301. See Langbein, supra note 79, at 37 (“The widespread longing for an afforced stan-
dard of proof in these cases, coupled with the equally widespread sense that the criminal
standard is misapplied in civil litigation, leads me to believe that the [clear and convincing]
standard strikes the appropriate balance.”); accord Sherwin, supra note 81, at 460 (“The dis-
pensation rule of the Restatement and the UPC purports to strike a balance between
formalism and case-by-case evaluation of testamentary intent by tempering judicial power to
disregard will execution formalities with a requirement of clear and convincing evidence.”).
302. See Langbein supra note 3 at 36–37.
303. See supra notes 286–297 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 85–87, 282–284 and accompanying text.
305. Langbein, supra note 79, at 37.
306. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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reducing the potential that they incorrectly reclassify formally de-
fective wills as authentic.307 However, the cautioning effect of the
clear and convincing standard could also be directed toward those
who attempt to execute legally effective wills. As discussed previ-
ously, by requiring wills to be written, signed, and witnessed, the
conventional law of will-execution encourages decedents to comply
with these formalities and therefore to leave behind robust evi-
dence of authenticity.308 Because authentic wills on average possess
a greater level of formality than inauthentic wills, courts more accu-
rately identify authentic wills, and consequently probate-error risk is
reduced.309
But just as some refined formality reform proposals could de-
crease the level of formality of authentic wills,310 a relaxed
compliance rule could increase the number of informal wills that
are nonetheless authentic. If a decedent knows that strict compli-
ance with the prescribed formalities is not required and that the
will’s proponent must only satisfy the preponderance standard to
validate the will, the incentive that she has to leave behind clear
evidence of authenticity could be reduced.311 Over time, this re-
duced incentive could lead to more authentic wills possessing lower
levels of formality, which in turn would make courts’ task of deter-
mining a will’s authenticity more difficult.312 Thus, a relaxed
compliance rule could increase probate-error risk because the dis-
tinction between authentic wills and inauthentic wills could become
blurred.313
However, the clear and convincing standard would likely main-
tain the decedent’s incentive to leave behind clear evidence of
authenticity. By requiring the proponent of a formally defective will
to present stronger evidence of authenticity, a higher standard of
proof reduces the likelihood that the court will reclassify a formally
307. However, as discussed previously, there seems to be little concern regarding the
competency of probate courts to make accurate determinations of authenticity. See supra
notes 295–297 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
309. See supra Part II.A.2.
310. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
311. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 468 (“It is generally understood that judges have power
to dispense with formality requirements and accept non-standard testamentary transactions,
testators might come to believe that the statutory procedures are no longer necessary.”).
312. See id. (explaining that because testators “might gradually abandon traditional testa-
mentary procedures in favor of other, perhaps cheaper, means of expressing testamentary
intent[,] [t]he language of testation would lose its currency, and the advantages of coordina-
tion and simplification could be lost”).
313. The potential effect of a relaxed compliance rule could be similar to the potential
effect of eliminating the attestation requirement. See supra notes 182–190 and accompanying
text.
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defective will as authentic, and consequently, those who want to
leave behind legally effective wills will find noncompliance less at-
tractive under a relaxed compliance rule that includes a clear and
convincing standard than under one that includes a preponder-
ance standard.314 Put simply, the reform movement wants to ease
the harshness of the conventional rule of strict compliance, but it
does not want to encourage testators to disregard the will-execution
process altogether. By titling the scales slightly in favor of invalidity,
the clear and convincing standard encourages decedents to care-
fully comply with the prescribed formalities,315 and it therefore
likely maintains the formal distinction between authentic wills and
inauthentic wills.
In sum, policymakers must select the standard of proof that the
proponent of a will must satisfy before the court excuses a formal
defect. By requiring nearly incontrovertible evidence of authentic-
ity and tilting the scales heavily in favor of invalidity, the reasonable
doubt standard substantially restricts the instances in which the
court could correct false-negative outcomes.316 Because a relaxed
formal compliance rule that includes a reasonable doubt standard
would produce results similar to the conventional rule of strict com-
pliance, such a standard of proof would render reform
ineffective.317
314. E.g., Sherwin, supra note 81, at 469 (“[A] clear and convincing evidence standard
might be offered as a way to minimize the dangers of the dispensation rule: a higher standard
of proof will weight judicial decision-making against the acceptance of informal document,
and so minimize the number and variety of judicial exceptions to formality rules. Fewer and
narrower exceptions will in turn make alternate means of expression riskier and therefore
less attractive.”); see also Langbein, supra note 79, at 23 (explaining that under the harmless
error rule “[n]oncompliance is hardly an enticing option”). But see Sherwin, supra note 81, at
469–70 (“The reason why testators and their lawyers would continue to comply with statutory
formalities rather than experiment with other more informal transactions is not to avoid
having to produce clear and convincing evidence at a later trial, but to avoid any litigation
over the question of testamentary intent. Because a high standard of proof provides no signif-
icant incentive to testators, it contributes little, if anything, to preserving the practice of
compliance with statutory formalities.”).
315. A related concern with a relaxed compliance rule is that the possibility that a for-
mally defective will might be valid could increase the likelihood that wrongdoers will attempt
to pass a fraudulent will through the probate process. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 881 (“[O]ne
concern with harmless error . . . is that th[is] doctrine[ ] might increase . . . the opportunity
for fraud and undue influence”). This concern is similar to the concerns raised by the propo-
sal to eliminate the attestation requirement. See supra notes 184–187 and accompanying text.
However, proponents of reform argue that the clear and convincing standard reduces the
risk of fraud. See Kelly, supra note 26, at 881 (explaining that “one concern with harmless
error . . . is that th[is] doctrine[ ] might increase . . . the opportunity for fraud and undue
influence” but that the UPC’s harmless error rule “mitigate[s] this potential concern by re-
quiring ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”).
316. See supra notes 282–284 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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Although the reasonable doubt standard should be dismissed,
the preponderance of the evidence and the clear and convincing
evidence standards represent viable standard of proof options. The
preponderance standard allows the court to excuse formal defects
when the decedent more likely than not intended to execute a
will.318 By contrast, the clear and convincing evidence standard re-
quires a greater likelihood of authenticity than the preponderance
standard but does not require the near certainty that the reasona-
ble doubt standard requires.319 Proponents of the preponderance
standard argue that courts should have the broadest discretion to
correct false-negative outcomes so that probate-error risk is mini-
mized.320 Some advocates of reform argue, however, that the
preponderance standard is too drastic a departure from the con-
ventional law and that such reform may have adverse consequences
that could increase probate-error risk.321 Therefore, while it seems
clear that a relaxed compliance rule that includes a clear and con-
vincing standard would reduce the probate-error risk that exists
under the conventional law, the question as to whether the prepon-
derance standard would further reduce probate-error risk remains
open.
CONCLUSION
The law of will-execution is a binary classification test that classi-
fies wills as either authentic or inauthentic.322 However, no method
of differentiating authentic wills from inauthentic wills is perfect.
Some authentic wills will be incorrectly classified as inauthentic,
and some inauthentic wills will be incorrectly classified as authentic.
Because both false-negative outcomes and false-positive outcomes
undermine the decedent’s intent,323 the goal of the law of will-exe-
cution should be to minimize the frequency of incorrect
classifications.324 Yet, the conventional law of will-execution is not
designed to minimize the total number of probate errors.325
By requiring the decedent to comply with a high level of formal-
ity, the conventional law produces a low risk of false-positive
318. See Sherwin, supra note 81, at 461.
319. See id. at 461–62.
320. See supra notes 141–152 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 160–170 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 4–13 and accompanying text.
323. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 148; see also supra notes 88–90 and accom-
panying text.
324. See supra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part II.A.
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outcomes and a relatively high risk of false-negative outcomes.326
Indeed, a decedent likely would not comply with a high level of
formality without intending the will to be legally effective.327 Con-
versely, a high level of formality raises the possibility that a
decedent intends to execute a legally effective will but fails to com-
ply due to mistake or ignorance.328 Moreover, by denying courts the
discretion to excuse harmless formal defects, the conventional law
prevents courts from correcting obvious false-negative outcomes.329
In this way, the conventional law heavily allocates risk in favor of
false-negative outcomes, and does not minimize the overall risk of
probate errors.
A reform movement has developed over the course of several de-
cades that seeks to change the conventional law of will-execution.330
This reform movement has proposed various reforms that are de-
signed to avoid the inequitable results that occur when courts
invalidate clearly authentic wills.331 Although many of these propos-
als would decrease probate-error risk, the reform movement
traditionally has not framed the goal of reform in this way. Conse-
quently, it has not fully explained the shortcomings of the
conventional law of will-execution or how reform would improve
the law’s accuracy in differentiating authentic wills from inauthen-
tic wills. This lack of clarity has likely contributed to the reform
movement’s struggle to implement widespread change. Therefore,
to provide clarity and focus to the goals and mechanics of will-exe-
cution reform, this Article develops a framework for thinking about
how the law of will-execution differentiates authentic wills from in-
authentic wills and how policymakers can adjust probate-error risk.
In sum, reform of the conventional law of will-execution has
proven to be a slow and incremental process. Nonetheless, the push
for reform continues, and relatively recent developments in a hand-
ful of states provide hope that more widespread change is
possible.332 This Article’s framework clarifies the purpose and effect
of will-execution reform and, consequently, increases the likelihood
that policymakers will implement change.
326. See supra Part I.A.
327. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 153; see also supra notes 47–48 and accom-
panying text.
328. See Glover, supra note 49, at 433–34; see also supra notes 49–50 and accompanying
text.
329. See supra Part I.B.
330. See supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text.
332. See supra Part III.B.1.
